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1. Introduction 
 
Neuroeconomics (NE) is an interdisciplinary subject that spans over multiple domains 
such as neuroscience, economics, and psychology. Despite the common goal of 
understanding how humans make decisions, the research of these disciplines was 
isolated from one another.  NE has been developed to combine the methodologies and 
evidence from these disciplines and ultimately to produce computational and 
neurobiological accounts of decision-making (Fehr and Rangel 2011; Glimcher 2011; 
Glimcher and Rustichini 2004; Camerer 2013; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 
2005; Camerer, Bhatt, and Hsu 2007; Camerer 2007; Camerer, Loewenstein, and 
Prelec 2004). The development of NE has greatly relied on the technology of 
measuring brain activity and is closely related to the research in other domains such 
as neuroscience, economics and psychiatry. In the following, I will briefly introduce 
the methodology in NE research and how research in NE can deepen our 
understanding of human behavior and improve research in other domains such as 
neuroscience, economics and psychiatry.  
1.1 Methodology 
 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a widely used technique to study 
neural mechanisms underpinning human behavior. It measures brain activity through 
oxygenated blood flow in the brain. Due to its good spatial resolution (millimeters) 
and fine temporal resolution (seconds), fMRI has been the most commonly used 
technique in NE research to identify the brain regions whose activity are associated 
with a decision-making process. Notably, it is often difficult to conclude on the 
functional necessity of regions for a specific task solely based on fMRI results.  
Several other approaches can aid fMRI on this issue and provide more insights. Such 
approaches include transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), transcranial direct-
current stimulation (tDCS), pharmacological interventions (e.g. Oxytocin), and 
studying patients with lesions. Another branch of techniques focuses on the 
anatomical architectures of the brain. One such technique is Voxel-based 
morphometry (VBM), a neuroimaging analysis method that can be used to study 
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differences in brain anatomy across individuals or between groups.  Such inter-
individual anatomical differences can then be associated with individual 
characteristics, dispositions and stable preferences. Due to the view that the brain is a 
dynamic network, there has been an increased interest to investigate the connectivity 
between different brain regions. Approaches to study brain connectivity include 
resting state functional connectivity, dynamic causal modelling, diffusion tensor 
imaging etc. Due to the limitations of each method, recently more researchers have 
attempted to combine multiple approaches in a study. For example, studies combining 
fMRI and VBM allow us to link the functional and anatomical evidence to better 
understand the functions of brain regions (Morishima et al. 2012), and the 
combination of genetics with fMRI to identify the genetic determinants of brain 
functions (Fang et al. 2013).  
1.2 Neuroeconomics improves research in neuroscience 
 
NE shares many research questions of neuroscience, namely to establish knowledge 
to promote the understanding and explanation of human behavior, but with a focus on 
decision-making in economic environments. NE integrates the traditional 
neuroscience research with behavioral economics and opens up new inquiries that are 
closely linked to real-life decision-making. For example, paradigms in behavioral 
economics such as the Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, and the Trust game have 
been widely used in NE studies to identify the neural substrates for various 
components of social preferences (Fehr and Camerer 2007). Similarly, the 
measurements of economic preferences in the financial domain (e.g. risk, ambiguity, 
and inter-temporal preferences) have been adopted in neuroscience studies to identify 
the neural networks involved in financial decision-making such as saving and 
investment behavior (Knutson and Bossaerts 2007; Kable and Glimcher 2010; Kable 
and Glimcher 2007; Tymula et al. 2012; Brevers et al. 2012; Camerer, Bhatt, and Hsu 
2007). These experimental paradigms improve the traditional measurement of human 
behavior in neuroscience, as these tasks provide clear incentives and similar social 
contexts as in real life. 
NE also brings new inquiries and opens up new research regimes for neuroscience 
research. For example, one set of inquiries focus on the link between neural signals in 
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the brain and the constructs proposed in behavioral economics, such as the preference 
for immediate reward, ambiguity aversion, preference for fairness and altruism (Kable 
and Glimcher 2010; Morishima et al. 2012; Brevers et al. 2012; Baumgartner et al. 
2011; Moll et al. 2006). Such understanding of the neural substrates for these 
variables permits predictions of human behavior (Tanaka et al. 2004; Salas et al. 
2010; Camerer 2007; Wang, Spezio, and Camerer 2010) and allows for tests on the 
causal role of brain areas through non-invasive stimulation techniques such as TMS 
and tDCS (Young et al. 2010; Camus et al. 2009; Santiesteban et al. 2012). 
1.3 Neuroeconomics improves research in economics 
 
There has been much debate and controversial opinions over the potential 
contributions that NE can bring to research in economics (Camerer, Loewenstein, and 
Prelec 2005; Fehr and Rangel 2011; Glimcher 2011; Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; 
Bernheim 2008). For example, Camerer et.al (2005) demonstrated the potential value 
of NE to economics by making an analogy to the development of organizational 
economics.  However, some economists are not fully convinced by such 
conceptualized reasoning and request more concrete examples. Below I focus on 
several aspects to discuss how NE can improve the research in economics.  
First, NE can aid economics in providing mechanistic explanations for human 
behavior. Economists often aim to not just describe but also explain people’s 
decisions. NE describes logical operations that not only predict behavior but also 
closely approximate the underlying physical and mental processes that lead to these 
behaviors (Glimcher 2011). For example, altruistic punishment is a well-documented 
phenomenon in behavioral economic studies. There have been competing theories 
about the sources of such behaviors (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; de Quervain 2004; 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999), and it is difficult to differentiate and pin down the most 
probable explanation solely based on behavioral observations. NE findings show that 
altruistic punishment behavior activates a region of reward processing (the dorsal 
striatum) and participants with stronger activations in this region were willing to incur 
greater costs for altruistic punishment (Quervain et al, 2004). These findings support 
the explanation that the satisfaction derived from punishing norm violations is one of 
the factors that drive the altruistic behavior (analogue to why humans seek out 
primary rewards such as food and sex).  
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Second, NE provides a new perspective to verify and select among economic models. 
NE can guide the search for appropriate empirical models, leading to more rapid and 
effective identification. A combination of neural measurement and experimental 
design allows for direct tests of the extent to which the computations made by the 
brain at the time of decision-making are consistent with the mechanisms posted by 
different theories (Frydman et al. 2011).  The study by Hsu et al (2009) provides a 
good example showing how NE can guide the selection of the functional form of 
economic models (Hsu et al. 2009). Here they find that brain activity during valuation 
of monetary gambles is nonlinear in probabilities, suggesting that the probability 
distortions may be a ubiquitous feature of human perception and cognition (Zhang 
and Maloney 2012). This study, together with the neurobiology finding that the 
valuation systems are not reference-point independent (Glimcher 2011), provide 
economists with additional reasons besides predictive considerations to favour 
prospect theory over traditional EUT models.  
Another example is a study that aims to test competing theories of the disposition 
effect (i.e. the tendency of investors to sell assets whose price has increased, while 
keeping assets that have dropped in value) (Frydman et al. 2011). They find that 
activity in an area of the brain known to encode the value of decisions (i.e. ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex) correlates with the outcomes of trades, and that the size of 
these neural signals correlates across subjects with the strength of the behavioral 
disposition effects. Furthermore, they find that activity in an area of the brain known 
to encode experienced utility (e.g. ventral striatum) exhibits a sharp upward spike in 
activity at precisely the moment at which a subject issues a command to sell a stock at 
a gain. These results strongly support realization utility theory that assumes that in 
addition to deriving utility from consumption, investors also derive utility directly 
from realizing gains and losses on the sale of risky assets that they own (Barberis and 
Xiong 2012; Caplin and Leahy 2001). By contrast, they find no significant association 
between the functional activity of these regions and the predictions from other 
theories (e.g. the mean-reversion model). 
Third, NE can help to develop new models with neurophysiological variables. Recent 
studies have started to develop this branch of research. For example, based on the 
premise that cognitive mechanisms (e.g. attention) affect behavior independently of 
preferences, an economic theory of addiction is developed by including psychological 
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variables (e.g. internal visceral states) in the model (Bernheim and Rangel 2004). 
Another example is that the experienced feelings related to our uncertainty about the 
future are incorporated to extend the expected utility theory, which can better explain 
behaviors inconsistent with standard rational economic models (Caplin and Leahy 
2001).  
Fourth, NE can help to make out of sample predictions. Prediction is one of the most 
important goals of positive economics. Economists wish to predict behavior under 
completely novel conditions (e.g. a new public policy). Models that do not take into 
account the mechanistic explanations often fail to provide reliable and robust out of 
sample predictions. In contrast, a good structural model, based on a deeper 
understanding of behavior, may permit reasonable predictions even when 
fundamental environmental changes occur (Camerer 2013). Due to the fact that the 
variance in behavior is ultimately mediated through the brain, the neurobiological 
signals contain important information to directly predict behavior. Mental states (e.g. 
conscious attention, fatigue, pain, and hunger, anxiety) have been shown to be very 
helpful in predicting choices (Loewenstein 2000; Loewenstein 1996; Caplin and 
Leahy 2001). NE provides some approaches to measure mental states, such as skin 
conductance, eye tracking, Electromyography (EMG), and facial action coding 
analysis. Moreover, it has been shown that financial choices can be predicted by 
antecedent neural activity (Knutson and Bossaerts 2007). A recent study demonstrates 
that non-choice neural data can be used for out of sample prediction (Smith et al. 
2012). They find that non-choice neural responses from the whole brain measured by 
fMRI can be used to predict real choices made by a particular individual, or average 
decisions made by a group of individuals in new choice situations with modest 
prediction power. 
1.4 Neuroeconomics improves research in psychiatry 
 
Psychiatric disorders are among the most prevalent and costly ailments worldwide, 
which have caused devastating personal and family consequences, and high social and 
health care service costs (Kessler et al. 2005). Current treatments for psychiatric 
disorders include medications, cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy, electroconvulsive 
therapy etc. (Association 2006). However, there are still a large proportion of patients 
who do not respond adequately to available treatments and even for the patients who 
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respond well to treatment, relapse is quite common (Simpson et al. 2008). Therefore, 
there is great need for new techniques and perspectives to improve existing treatments.  
Current psychiatric diagnoses are mostly based on clusters of symptoms and are 
inherently atheoretical. NE concepts may offer a potential integrated computationally 
based framework for understanding psychiatric problems and even improve the 
existing diagnosis and treatments. In the perspective of NE, people with mental 
disorders are considered as active agents, who attempts to make plans and obtain 
desired outcomes based on their judgments of the current and future states of 
environments. This perspective straightforwardly leads to the speculation that 
psychiatric disorders may be due to alternations or disruptions in the valuation 
process, such as reward perception, probability perception, and value assignment 
(Barke & Fairchild, 2012). It is proposed that a disrupted reward perception system 
would lead to the decreased ability to experience pleasure, one of the main symptoms 
of major depression. This speculation is supported by the study that deep brain 
stimulation (DBS) modulation of the NAcc had positive effects on anhedonia, which 
effectively led to an antidepressant treatment response (Schlaepfer et al, 2008). 
Notably, such improvement is shown in only a proportion of patients, and some 
adverse effects are observed in some patients after DBS treatments, suggesting the 
existence of more complicated causes for depression. 
Moreover, many other domains of NE research can also shed light on the mechanisms 
and diagnoses of a variety of psychiatric disorders. For example, the understandings 
of social cognition may help us to better recognize the causes for autism and 
psychopathy. Studies on decision-making under risk, ambiguity, and over time may 
improve our understanding in disorders including anxiety disorders, addiction, ADHD, 
OCD, and conduct disorder.  
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2. Contents of this Thesis 
 
In this thesis, my research aims to deepen our understanding of the neurobiological 
basis of charitable giving and learning behavior under uncertainty. I present three 
papers that offer novel insights on the neural mechanisms supporting human altruistic 
and learning behaviors. The key insights are summarized as follows. 
My first paper finds that human altruistic behaviors can be modulated through 
disrupting the functional activity of one brain area that has been proposed to be 
important for altruism, the right Temporoparietal Junction (rTPJ). Our study provides 
the first evidence that human altruism causally depends on the functional integrity of 
the rTPJ, beyond the previous correlational evidence.  
The second paper shows that the functional activity of locus coeruleus (LC) in the 
midbrain is associated with the learning rate in a changing environment. The learning 
rate is a fundamental parameter in reinforcement learning models that reflects the 
weight given to new information. Here I provide the first direct evidence for the direct 
link between the functional involvement of LC and the adaptive learning rate.  
The third paper demonstrates that the individual learning ability in a changing 
environment is associated with both the grey matter (GM) volume and the functional 
involvement of some key regions in the sensorimotor learning system (e.g. the 
cerebellum). My findings suggest that the information-updating mechanism of the 
sensory-motor system also subserves the belief updating process in higher-level 
decision-making under uncertainty.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A summary of each chapter in 
this thesis is provided in 2.1 to 2.3, respectively. Section 3 provides the discussion of 
my findings and a short outlook of the future research agenda. 
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2.1 The Causal Dependence of Human Altruism on the Functional 
Integrity of the Right TPJ 
 
Human altruism has been an important evolutionary force and shapes contemporary 
social and economic interactions. Converging evidence documents correlations 
between the functional activity and neuroanotomical structures of the right 
Temporoparietal Junction (rTPJ) and human altruistic behavior. However, correlation 
does not imply causation as it is not known whether rTPJ activity causes people to be 
altruistic or whether altruistic choice induces rTPJ activity. The aim of this study is to 
provide causal evidence for the involvement of rTPJ in altruistic behavior by 
disrupting neural activity in rTPJ using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). A 
total of 61 healthy subjects participated in this experiment and were randomly 
assigned to either the treatment (rTPJ) or control group (vertex). They were asked to 
complete a set of tasks. I measured subjects' judgments about 70 charities by asking 
them to rate the charities on deservingness, closeness, familiarity and charity age on a 
5-point-scale before TMS was applied. Immediately after the application of TMS 
subjects started a donation task, in which they were endowed with 100 points (50 
CHF) and asked to decide the amounts they would like to donate to each charity. One 
trial was randomly chosen at the end of the experiment. The amount donated in the 
chosen trial was transferred to the charity anonymously and the rest was given to the 
subject as payment. Following this, subjects re-evaluated a random half of the 70 
charities on the four dimensions while the effects of TMS were still lasting. I included 
this step to test the hypothesis whether the perceived deservingness of the charities 
was changed by TMS. In this study I show that the disruption of rTPJ by theta-burst 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) substantially reduces subjects’ 
donations to charities. Specifically, I find that the decreased charitable donations are 
probably driven by a decrease of willingness to donate but not by the change of 
perceived deservingness of charities. Moreover, I find that such effects of disrupting 
rTPJ activity are more pronounced for charities with concrete and vivid social 
contexts. These findings suggest a strong causal dependence of human altruism on the 
functional integrity of the rTPJ that seems to be causally involved in the encoding of 
the willingness to help rather than the perceptions of deservingness.  
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2.2 Neural Correlates of Learning Rate in a Changing Environment 
 
Our interactions with the environment always involve imperfect observations. 
Updating beliefs correctly based on new observations is central to learning behaviors. 
The learning rate (LR) is a fundamental parameter in reinforcement learning models 
that reflects the weight given to new information. However, the neural substrates that 
encode the LR still remain unclear. Locus coeruleus (LC) has been proposed as the 
core component of the neural network of learning under uncertainty, which signals 
unexpected uncertainty and has other sophisticated regulation function in learning 
under uncertainty. There has also been indirect evidence that associates the functional 
activity of LC with the LR, while the direct empirical functional evidence is still 
missing.  
To answer this question, I conduct an fMRI study in which subjects complete a 
number-guessing task. In this task, subjects are asked to guess the mean of the 
underlying distribution based on a series of samples while the mean and the noise 
level of the underlying distribution can both change unexpectedly for multiple times 
over a session. I estimate the learning rates based on a reinforcement learning model. 
The learning rates are then used as parametric modulators to trace the corresponding 
neural correlates. I find that participants’ LRs vary according to local statistical 
features: (i) The LR is lower in contexts with a higher noise level, and (ii) The LR is 
higher in contexts with a changing mean and a stable noise level (a relevant change) 
compared to contexts with a stable mean and a changing noise level (an irrelevant 
change. Furthermore, I find that the adaptive LR is positively correlated with the 
functional activity of a region in pons, consistent with the position of locus coeruleus 
(LC), at the individual level, providing the first direct empirical evidence for the link 
between functional activity of LC and the adaptive LR.  
 
2.3 Structural and Functional Neural Correlates of Individual Learning 
Ability  
 
Individuals differ in their ability to learn the state of the world and hidden reward 
contingencies, particularly when the situation involves a high degree of uncertainty. 
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However, it still remains unclear what the neuroanatomical determinants underlying 
such heterogeneity are. Here I measure individual learning ability by comparing the 
learning performance of each individual with that of a Bayesian updating model. I 
find that there is a large variety in learning performance across subjects and such 
individual differences are associated with both the grey matter (GM) volume and 
functional involvement of cerebellum and a brain area covering the right postcentral 
gyrus, Inferior Parietal cortex and Supramarginal gyrus (I label this cluster as right 
postcentral parietal cortex). These results provide congruent evidence for the 
importance of the cerebellum, postcentral and parietal cortex in information 
integration and suggest a link between the lower-order sensory-motor information 
processing and the foresight process in higher-order learning under uncertainty. 
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3. Conclusion and discussion 
 
The studies in my thesis provide empirical evidence and new insights for the existing 
theories on the neurobiology of altruism and learning behavior, and open up a branch 
of new research. Below I discuss these findings and provide some principle directions 
worth pursuing in future research.  
In the first chapter, I find that disruption of the neural activity in rTPJ reduces 
charitable donations. Specifically, I find that the decreased charitable donations are 
probably driven by the decreased willingness to donate but not the perceived 
deservingness of charities. Moreover, I find that these effects of disrupting rTPJ 
activity are more evident for charities with more concrete and vivid social contexts. 
These findings suggest a strong causal dependence of human altruism on the 
functional integrity of the rTPJ that seems to be causally involved in the encoding of 
the willingness to help rather than the perceptions of deservingness. My TMS study 
provides empirical evidence of and new insights into the neurobiology of altruism. A 
model motivated by neuroimaging data is that altruistic decisions are constructed via 
the online computations in VMPFC, the general valuation region, by weighting 
information from multiple sources, such as the deservingness of the recipients and 
self-interest (4, 15). Our findings suggest that rTPJ is not involved in the social 
perception per se, but rather in linking social knowledge to the construction of value 
signals. Further elucidation of the generalization of this causal role of rTPJ in other 
forms of altruism will be an important aspect of future research. In addition, my 
findings may shed light on the neural basis of inconsistent donation behavior in 
different contexts. For example, contexts directing one’s attention to others can 
increase altruistic behaviors, such as having an imagined conversation or receiving a 
direct eye gaze before making decisions (Lin et al. 2012; Batson et al. 1988; Andreoni 
and Rao 2011). I speculate that these approaches successfully up-regulate the activity 
in rTPJ, which induces an increased willingness to conduct altruistic behaviors, just as 
a smell of freshly baked bread increases the purchase of bread. This may provide 
some insight into ways to pre-test the effectiveness of fundraising strategies, e.g. 
testing whether one strategy can induce higher activity in TPJ, which might be of 
great interest to non-profit organizations and charities as donations are their major 
	   12	  
funding sources. Moreover, my results may expand economic models of charitable 
giving by incorporating the neural activity of rTPJ as a component in the models. 
Furthermore, my results fit in well with recent work on neuro-developmental 
disorders. Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) typically have impairments in social 
abilities and are found to have deficiencies in the development of TPJ such as 
decreased grey matter volume (Steyer et al.; Greimel et al. 2012). Based on my results, 
I speculated that compared to normal controls, ASDs would have reduced donations 
and a decreased dependency of donations on judgments of charities. These are exactly 
the findings reported in a recent study on ASDs (Lin et al. 2012). This study expands 
previous neuroimaging findings and lends empirical evidence for the causal role of 
rTPJ in charitable giving. Still, I are not able to conclude the degree to which the 
observed effects are specific to the targeted region or instead reflect the combined 
result of the target and other regions to which it is connected, due to the limitation of 
TMS that the effects might spread over time to regions connected to the target rTPJ. 
In the second chapter, I find that subjects adopt adaptive LR according to the local 
volatility and noise level, and such adaptive learning rate is associated with the 
functional activity of a region in pons, a position consistent with LC. These findings 
provide the first direct empirical evidence for the link between the functional 
involvement of LC and the adaptive LR, supporting the crucial role of LC in the 
regulation of optimal learning under uncertainty (Yu and Dayan 2003; Aston-Jones 
and Cohen 2005). Additionally, I find that a transient component of the learning rate 
is positively correlated with the functional activity of a different set of regions, ACC 
and RIFG, two core regions in the monitoring system, which have been documented 
to engage in swift cognitive control and working memory (e.g. Aron, Robbins, and 
Poldrack 2004; Chikazoe et al. 2007; Krawczyk 2002; Botvinick, Cohen, and Carter 
2004; Holroyd et al. 2004; Achtziger et al. 2012). Moreover, the co-activation of ACC 
and RIFG was associated with the performance after a change of the reward 
contingency in reversal learning (Ghahremani et al. 2010). The encoding of LR can be 
a complex cognitive function that encompasses a diverse range of processes involved 
in linking multiple sources of information and selective retrieval of information from 
memory, which may be supported by anatomically distributed brain networks that 
share information in a dynamic manner. My findings here suggest that there may be 
two parallel systems supporting the adaptive adjustment of LR. The first system, 
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including LC, is mainly involved in tracking the average features of a recent history 
and adapt LR accordingly; whereas the second system, including ACC and RIFG, 
compensate the first system by providing more precise and swift adjustment based on 
spontaneous information at each time point. Some existing evidence supports this 
speculation. For example, it has been found that ACC and LC closely interact with 
each other in learning under uncertainty (e.g. Yu & Dayan, 2005). However, the 
dissociation and specific role of each network requires further research.  
In the third chapter, I find that there is great heterogeneity in individual learning 
performances in a changing environment and that such individual differences are 
associated with the GM volume of regions in the cerebellum and right postcentral 
parietal cortex and with the functional involvement of these two regions during 
learning. These findings provide congruent structural and functional evidence for the 
importance of the cerebellum and right postcentral parietal cortex in successful 
learning and information integration. Our finding that the GM volume and functional 
involvement of cerebellum and postcentral parietal cortex are associated with 
individual learning performance suggest a link between the lower-order sensory-
motor information processing and the belief updating process in higher-order learning 
under uncertainty. During evolution of human beings, higher cognitive functions 
evolved from the basic sensory-motor functions. Therefore, it is possible that the 
information updating mechanism of the sensory-motor system also serves the higher-
level learning under uncertainty.  Consistently, it has been reported that a relationship 
exists between the cerebellar brain volume and cognitive function (Hogan et al. 
2011), between abnormal exploration in autism and cerebellum abnormality and 
between cerebellum brain volume with children with attention deficit hyperactivity 
(ADHD) (Pierce and Courchesne 2001).Furthermore, my findings may shed new light 
on developing treatments for clinical psychological patients. Negative emotions (e.g. 
frustration, anxiety and helplessness) and even psychological disorder symptoms (e.g. 
depression and anxiety disorders) can be induced if individuals lack the ability to 
correctly learn the state of the world. On the one hand, individuals can deviate from 
optimal updating by overweighting the history, which leads to insensitivity to the 
fundamental changes of environments and failure to adapt to new situations. On the 
other hand, individuals may overweight new information, which causes over alertness 
and response to stochastic fluctuations. The cerebellum has been proposed to be a 
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highly plastic and good target for clinical interventions (Mackie et al. 2007), 
providing new approaches for improving individual’s learning ability and 
consequently alleviating negative emotions. Finally, I would like to point out that the 
relatively small sample size employed in my study allowed for the detection of 
moderate-sized effects, while brain structures whose GM volume correlate with 
learning performance of a smaller magnitude were not able to detect. Future research 
is required to test the generalizability of my findings, with larger and more diverse 
samples of participants.  
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A. The Causal Dependence of Human Altruism on the 
Functional Integrity of the Right Temporoparietal 
Junction 
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The Causal Dependence of Human Altruism on the Functional 
Integrity of the Right Temporoparietal Junction 
 
Chaohui Guo, Sunhae Sul, Nora Heinzelmann, Christian Ruff *, Ernst Fehr * 
 
Abstract 
 
Human altruism has been an important evolutionary force and shapes contemporary 
social and economic interactions. Converging evidence documents associations 
between the right Temporoparietal Junction (rTPJ) and human altruistic behavior. 
However, association does not imply causation as it is not known whether rTPJ 
activity causes people to be altruistic or whether altruistic choice induces rTPJ 
activity. In this study, we show that disruption of rTPJ by theta-burst repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) substantially reduces subjects’ donations to 
charities. Specifically, we find that the decreased charitable donations are probably 
driven by a decrease of the willingness to donate but not by changes in the perceived 
deservingness of charities. Moreover, we find that the effects of disrupting rTPJ 
activity are more pronounced for charities with concrete and vivid social contexts. 
These findings suggest a strong causal dependence of human altruism on the 
functional integrity of the rTPJ that seems to be causally involved in the encoding of 
willingness to donate rather than the perceptions of deservingness. 
Key words: charitable giving, Temporoparietal Junction, TMS, deservingness  
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Introduction 
 
Charitable donations, as the major source of revenue for nonprofits and charities, play 
a crucial role in human society (Fang et al., 2013; Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; 
Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel, 2010; Moll et al., 2006). Given such an 
important role, numerous scientific fields attempt to identify and understand the 
driving forces of charitable giving (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; E. Fehr & Camerer, 
2007; Hare et al., 2010). Recent neuroimaging studies have started to explore the 
neurobiological basis of charitable giving (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 
2008; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2010; Moll et al., 2006; Tymula et al., 2012;). 
These studies show that charitable giving activates the fronto-mesolimbic network as 
well as neural regions involved in social cognition, suggesting that donation decisions 
are not fundamentally different from other costly choices and that the online 
computation of such decisions draws on multiple processes such as shifting attention 
to others, reward processing and valuation. In particular, right temporoparietal 
junction (rTPJ) seems to play a crucial role in charitable giving, as activity in rTPJ 
predicts subjects’ donation amounts (Hare et al., 2010).  Moreover, rTPJ has been 
shown to be functionally connected with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), 
a region typically involved in valuation processes, during the online computation of 
donation decisions (Hare et al., 2010). 
The importance of rTPJ in altruism is suggested by other findings as well. The rTPJ is 
known to be involved in tasks that require attention to others, such as perception of 
agency, mentalizing, empathy, theory of mind, perspective-taking and moral 
judgment (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Morishima et al., 2012; Santiesteban, Banissy, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2012; Young et al., 2010). These findings suggest an important 
functional role of rTPJ in theory of mind and attention to others, which may be a 
prerequisite of altruistic decisions. Moreover, the ability to focus on and take the 
perspective of others may facilitate altruism, as preschoolers with theory of mind 
abilities are more altruistic (Takagishi et al., 2010). Results from voxel-based 
morphometry show that gray matter volume in rTPJ predicts the propensity to behave 
altruistically. In addition, rTPJ shows stronger functional activity when participants 
face a higher conflict between altruistic and selfish acts (Morishima et al., 2012). 
These studies provide solid evidence for the correlation between the functional 
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activity of rTPJ and altruistic behaviors. However, correlation does not imply 
causation, as it is unknown whether the activity of rTPJ causes people to be altruistic 
or whether altruistic choice drives the activity of rTPJ. If the former case is true, rTPJ 
would be necessary for altruistic behaviors, and the modulation of the functional 
activity of rTPJ would cause a change in the altruistic decisions. By contrast, if the 
latter case is true, modulating the activity of rTPJ would not induce any change in the 
altruistic decisions. This leads to the empirical questions addressed in this study: Does 
charitable giving causally depend on the functional integrity of rTPJ? What is the 
specific functional role of rTPJ in the process of making donation decisions? To 
address these questions, we applied TMS, a technique that induces a temporary 
disruption of the activity in a brain region and allows researchers to investigate the 
causal relationship between brain regions and behavioral outcomes. 
Donation decisions are influenced by the perceived deservingness of targets.   It has 
been shown that people’s donation amounts increase monotonically with respect to 
the perceived deservingness of charities (e.g. Hare et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
donation decisions are also greatly influenced by individual’s willingness to donate 
when the perceived deservingness is controlled for (Frydman, Barberis, Camerer, 
Bossaerts, & Rangel, 2011; Hare et al., 2010). For example, a generous individual 
might donate more than a selfish one to a charity that they both consider as highly 
deserving. This leads to two plausible hypotheses concerning the role of rTPJ in 
charitable giving. One hypothesis is that rTPJ is involved in the encoding of the 
individual willingness to donate but not in the perception of deservingness per se.  
Under this hypothesis, disruption of rTPJ will lead to a decrease of the willingness to 
donate and consequently declined donations while the perceived deservingness 
remains unaffected (Figure 1A). This hypothesis is consistent with the finding that 
individuals with stronger rTPJ activation have higher willingness to donate (Hare et 
al., 2010). An alternative but equally plausible hypothesis is that rTPJ is necessary for 
the perceptions of the deservingness but not in the encoding of the willingness to 
donate. According to this hypothesis, disrupting the activity of rTPJ will cause a 
decrease in the perceived deservingness while the willingness to donate remains 
unaffected, which also leads to a decline in donations (Figure 1B).
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Figure 1. Schematic illustrations of our hypotheses. A. Hypothesis one: rTPJ is 
involved in the encoding of the willingness to donate but not in the perception of 
deservingness per se. Under this hypothesis, the disruption of rTPJ will lead to a 
decrease of the willingness to donate and consequently a decline in donations while 
the perceived deservingness remains unaffected, i.e. a shift from the pre-TMS (blue 
line) to the post-TMS (red line). B. Hypothesis two: rTPJ is involved in the forming 
or getting access to the deservingness of charities but not in the encoding of 
willingness to donate. According to this hypothesis, disruption of rTPJ will cause a 
decrease in the perceived deservingness and consequently decreased donations (i.e. a 
shift from the blue dot to the red dot), while the relationship slope between donations 
and perceived deservingness remains unaffected. 
 
 
 
Methods 
 
To test our hypotheses, we employed continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to 
disrupt the activity of the target region (rTPJ for the treatment and vertex for control 
group). cTBS is an effective repetitive TMS protocol that produces powerful and 
long-lasting (up to 60 min) effects after an application period of 40s. A total of 61 
healthy subjects participated in our experiment and were randomly assigned to either 
the treatment (rTPJ) or control group (vertex). They were asked to complete a set of 
tasks, and the timeline of tasks and TMS is described in Figure 2a. We first measured 
subjects’ judgments towards 70 charities by asking them to rate the charities on 
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deservingness, closeness, familiarity and charity age on a 5-point-scale before TMS 
was applied. Closeness is defined here as the possibility that the subject or someone 
she knows can directly benefit from this charity).  Closeness, familiarity and charity 
age were included as control dimensions. Immediately after the application of TMS, 
subjects performed a donation task.  In the task, subjects were endowed with 100 
points (50 CHF) and asked to decide how much they would like to donate to the 
charity presented on screen during the trial (Figure 2c). One trial was randomly 
chosen at the end of the experiment for payment. The donation on the chosen trial was 
transferred to the charity anonymously and the rest was kept by the subject as 
payment.  After completing the donation task, subjects re-evaluated half of the 70 
charities, selected at random, on the same four dimensions while still under the effects 
of TMS. We included this step to test whether the perceived deservingness of the 
charities was changed by TMS. Additional details are provided in the Supplementary 
materials. 
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Figure 2. Experimental design. a. Experimental timeline. First, subjects completed a 
pre-TMS charity evaluation task. In this task subjects were presented with the name, 
mission, and a one-paragraph description of a charity on each trial and asked to rate 
the deservingness, closeness, familiarity and age of the charity on a 5-point-scale in a 
self-paced manner. Upon completion of the first part, subjects were asked to report 
their mood on a multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF, Steyer et.al, 1997). 
Afterwards, we evaluated the active motor threshold (AMT) for each subject and 
delivered the theta-burst TMS. Two minutes after the stimulation, subjects performed 
the donation task. Subjects were endowed 100 points (1 point = 0.5 CHF) for every 
trial and asked to decide how many points to donate to a given charity. Only one trial 
was randomly chosen and implemented for real at the end of the experiment. As soon 
as the donation task was completed, subjects started the post-TMS evaluation task, in 
which they evaluated a random half of the 70 charities on the four dimensions for the 
second time. At the end, subjects reported their mood on MDBF again. b. Stimulation 
site for TMS was defined as a 5-mm sphere around [51, -45, 21] on the MNI template, 
based on findings in a previous study (Hare et al, 2010), and then reverse normalized 
to each subject’s anatomical brain (Supplementary materials). c. An example trial of 
the donation task. On each trial, subjects had 8s to input the donation amount.  
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Analysis and Results 
 
To investigate whether charitable giving causally depends on the functional integrity 
of rTPJ, we performed multiple linear regression analysis with the donation amounts 
as the dependent variable, the site of TMS as the independent variable, and scores 
from questionnaires as control variables (details see Supplementary materials, 
Material and methods). The results of the multiple linear regression analysis are 
shown in Table S1. Our results demonstrate that there is a significant main effect of 
TMS treatment (treatment effect, β = -11.33, p < .01), i.e. donation amounts are 
significantly lower in the rTPJ group compared to the vertex group, suggesting that 
charitable giving causally depends on the functional integrity of rTPJ.  
In a second step, we focused on understanding the specific functional role of rTPJ in 
the process of donation decisions. Our first hypothesis is that the disruption of rTPJ 
will decrease the willingness to donate and consequently cause a reduction of overall 
donations. To test this hypothesis, we performed multiple linear regression analysis 
with the donation amounts as the dependent variable, the site of TMS, the linear term 
of deservingness and the interaction term between deservingness and TMS as 
independent variables and other scores as control variables (Supplementary materials, 
Material and methods). The results of the multiple linear regression analysis are 
shown in Figure 3 and Table S2. First, our results replicate previous findings (Hare et 
al., 2010) and showed that donation amounts increased monotonically with 
deservingness (β = 12.77, p < .001). Second, our results demonstrate that, in addition 
to the main effect of treatment, there was a significant interaction effect of treatment 
(TMS site) and deservingness (β = -5.16, p < .05), i.e. the willingness to donate for 
each unit increase of deservingness was significantly decreased in the rTPJ compared 
to the vertex group. As shown in Figure 3, both groups had similarly low donations 
for the charities that were considered as not deserving at all (6 points for both groups), 
whereas the increasing donation amounts for each unit increase of the deservingness 
is significantly smaller in rTPJ group than the vertex group. Thus, our results 
demonstrate that disruption of rTPJ activity causes a decrease of willingness to donate, 
which are consistent with the predictions of our first hypothesis.    
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Figure 3. Treatment effects on willingness to donate. Predicted donations as a 
function of perceived deservingness (converted into z-scores) for vertex (blue) and 
rTPJ (red) groups based on estimations from multiple linear regression. Shaded areas 
represent bootstrapped standard errors (Supplementary, Analyses and Table S2).  This 
figure is produced only for the purpose of illustration.  
 
 
Next, we tested whether disrupting the activity of rTPJ influences the perceived 
deservingness of charities. We found that the deservingness ratings of pre-TMS are 
strongly correlated with those of post-TMS in both treatment groups (Pearson 
correlation, mean r_deservingness = .80 for rTPJ and .79 for vertex), and the correlation 
coefficients do not differ between two groups (tested after Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation; Figure 4). These results suggest that disrupting the activity of rTPJ 
does not influence the perception of deservingness. Similarly, we found that 
disrupting rTPJ activity does not influence the judgments towards charities in any of 
the other dimensions (Pearson’s correlation, r_closeness = .64 for rTPJ and .68 for vertex; 
r_familiarity = .80 for rTPJ and .83 for vertex; r_age = .65 for rTPJ and .63 for vertex; 
tested after Fisher’s r-to-z transformation; Figure S1). Our results demonstrate that 
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disruption of rTPJ activity decreased the willingness to donate while having no 
influence on the perceived deservingness of charities.  Thus, these results support our 
hypothesis that rTPJ is involved in encoding the willingness to donate but not in 
evaluating the deservingness of charities.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Perceived deservingness was not affected by TMS treatment. 
Deservingness ratings of pre-TMS were strongly correlated with those of post-TMS in 
both rTPJ and vertex group (Pearson correlation, mean r_deservingness = .80 for rTPJ 
and .79 for vertex), and the correlation coefficients do not differ between two groups 
(tested after Fisher’s r-to-z transformation). We illustrate the linear regression line 
with the deservingness of post-TMS as the dependent variable and the deservingness 
of pre-TMS as the independent variable for the Vertex (blue) and TPJ (red) group. 
 
 
Moreover, based on recent findings that rTPJ has special importance for human 
behavior in social contexts (Andreoni & Rao, 2011; Batson et al., 1988; Carter et al., 
2012; Carter & Huettel, 2013), we predicted that disrupting the rTPJ activity would 
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have a larger influence on charitable giving for charities with more concrete and vivid 
social context. To test this prediction, we first classified our charities into two types 
according to the direct targets of charities.  Charities are classified as Human-charity 
if the recipients of charitable aid are human (e.g. disabled) and Non-human-charity if 
the recipients are not human (e.g. rainforest, animal shelter), resulting in 51 Human-
charity and 19 Non-human-charity. Next, we performed separate linear regressions, as 
in the second step, for the Human-charity and Non-human-charity classes (Table S3 
and S4). Our results showed that there were significant main effect of treatment (β = -
8.63, p < .05) and interaction effect of treatment and deservingness (β = -6.36, p < .05) 
for the Human-charity, but not for the Non-human-charity.  These findings are 
consistent with our predictions and suggest that rTPJ plays a more important role in 
donations to charities with humans as recipients of aid than to those with non-humans 
as direct targets.  
Furthermore, to examine whether the application of TMS on different sites induced 
different levels of discomforts and mood changes for the two treatment groups, we 
performed linear regressions for the change of mood in three subscales (good-bad, 
awake-tired, calm-nervous) as a function of treatment group. The results showed that 
the change of mood did not differ between the two groups in any of the subscales 
(Supplementary Table S6).   
 
Discussion 
 
Taken together, we find that disruption of neural activity in rTPJ reduces charitable 
donations. Specifically, we find that lower charitable donations are probably caused 
by the decreased willingness to donate but not by the changes in the perceived 
deservingness of charities. Moreover, we find that the effect of disrupting rTPJ 
activity is more pronounced for charities with concrete social contexts. These findings 
enable us to claim a causal dependency of charitable giving on the functional integrity 
of rTPJ that seems to be causally involved in the encoding of willingness to donate 
rather than the perceptions of deservingness.  
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Our TMS study provides empirical evidence of and new insights into the 
neurobiology of human altruism. A model motivated by neuroimaging data is that 
altruistic decisions are constructed via the online computations in VMPFC, the 
general valuation region, by weighting information from multiple sources, such as the 
deservingness of the recipients and self-interest (Hare et.al, 2010). Our findings 
suggest that rTPJ is involved in conveying social perceptions of deservingness to the 
valuation region (VMPFC) to make donation decisions.  Notably, social knowledge 
and perceptions of charities remained unaffected by the change of the neural activity 
in rTPJ, additionally supporting the notion that rTPJ is not involved in the encoding of 
social perception per se, but rather in linking social knowledge to the construction of 
value signals. Further elucidation of the generalization of this causal role of rTPJ in 
other forms of altruism will be an important aspect of future research.  
In addition, our findings may shed light on the neural basis of inconsistent donation 
behavior in different contexts. For example, contexts directing one’s attention to 
others can increase altruistic behaviors, such as having an imagined conversation or 
receiving a direct eye gaze before making decisions (Andreoni & Rao, 2011; Batson 
et al., 1988). We speculate that these approaches successfully up-regulate the activity 
in rTPJ, which induces an increased willingness to perform altruistic behaviors, just 
as a smell of freshly baked bread increases the purchase of bread. This may provide 
some insight into ways to pre-test the effectiveness of fundraising strategies, e.g. 
testing whether one strategy can induce higher activity in rTPJ, which might be of 
great interest to non-profit organizations and charities as donations are their major 
sources of funding. Moreover, our results may expand economic models of charitable 
giving by incorporating the neural activity of rTPJ as a component in the models. 
Finally, our results well relate to recent work on neuro-developmental disorders. 
Individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) typically have 
impairments in social abilities and are found to have deficiencies in the development 
of TPJ such as decreased grey matter volume (Greimel et al., 2012). Based on our 
results, we speculate that, compared to healthy controls, ASDs would have reduced 
donations and a decreased dependency of donations on judgments of a charity’s 
deservingness. These are exactly the findings reported in a recent study on ASDs (Lin 
et al., 2012). 
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This study expands previous neuroimaging findings and lends empirical evidence for 
the causal role of rTPJ in charitable giving. Still, we cannot conclude the degree to 
which the observed effects are specific to the targeted region or reflect the combined 
result of the target and other regions to which it is connected, due to the limitation of 
TMS that the effects might spread over time to regions connected to the target rTPJ. 
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Supplementary materials 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Subjects 
65 healthy subjects (39 female; 18-40 years old, mean age: 23±4 years) with no 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness participated in our task and were 
randomly assigned to either the treatment (rTPJ, N = 31) or control (vertex, N = 30) 
group. Four subjects were excluded due to the excessive missing trials or atypical 
responses to the TMS. The study was approved by the ethics committee of Canton 
Zurich. Written informed consent was obtained from each participant.  
Experiment procedure 
Subjects filled out a set of online questionnaires several days before they came to the 
lab, including empathy questionnaire (Davis, 1983), personality (NEO FFI, Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), and social value orientation (SVO, van Lange et al., 1997). Notably, 
subjects were paid for the completion of the online questionnaires based on their 
choices in the social value orientation questionnaire. One out of the nine questions 
was randomly chosen at the end and subjects’ choices in this question decided 
payments for themselves and the anonymous partners that they were randomly 
matched to.  
Each of the subjects who had completed the online questionnaires was invited to the 
laboratory and asked to perform a behavioral session which consisted of three parts: a 
pre-TMS charity evaluation, a donation task, and a post-TMS charity evaluation. In 
the pre-TMS charity evaluation task, subjects were asked to rate the deservingness, 
closeness, familiarity and age of 70 charities on a 5-point scale in a self-paced 
manner. We defined deservingness as how much the charity deserves supports, 
closeness as how much the subject herself or someone she knows can directly benefit 
from the charity, familiarity as how much she hears of or knows about the charity, and 
age as how old she assesses the charity. Importantly, deservingness measures 
subjects’ judgments towards the social importance of each charity and thus is 
included as a factor of our main interest. Nevertheless, donations might also be 
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influenced by other features of the charity, such as the likelihood of a direct benefit 
from and the familiarity and perceived history of the charity. Therefore we include the 
closeness, familiarity and charity age as control variables. On each trial, we presented 
the name of a charity, a brief description of its mission, and a rating scale. The brief 
description of each charity consisted of two sentences.  The first sentence described 
the charity’s general mission and targets, and the second one provided a concrete 
example of the charity’s projects. Subjects rated the same 70 charities on one of the 
four dimensions and then moved to another dimension. The order in which the rating 
dimensions were presented was randomized across subjects.  For each rating 
dimension, 70 charities were presented in a random order. Upon completion of the 
first part, subjects were asked to report their mood on a multidimensional mood 
questionnaire (MDBF, (17)). 
Afterwards, we evaluated the active motor threshold (AMT) for each subject and 
delivered the theta-burst TMS as described below in the TMS procedure section. Two 
minutes after the stimulation, subjects performed the donation task. In donation task, 
the name and main mission of one of the 70 charities were presented for each trial. 
Charities were presented in random order. Subjects were endowed with 100 points (1 
point = 0.5 CHF) for every trial and asked to decide how many points to donate to a 
given charity (Figure 2c). One out of 70 trials was randomly chosen and implemented 
at the end of the experiment. That is, if one donated X points to the chosen charity, 
X*0.5 CHF were transferred to the charity anonymously and (100-X)*0.5CHF were 
paid to the subject in addition to a base payment. This procedure ensures subjects 
consider each charity independently and do not need to distribute the money across 
charities. 
As soon as the donation task was completed, subjects started the post-TMS evaluation 
task, in which they evaluated a random half of the 70 charities on the four dimensions 
for the second time. Only half of the charities were included due to the limited time 
range of TMS effects. We included this step to address whether the judgments of the 
charities were changed by TMS. Afterwards, we asked subjects to report their mood 
on the MDBF questionnaire again. Notably, to keep the effect of TMS consistent 
across subjects, we made subjects perform the donation and post-TMS evaluation task 
within the same time window by fixing the trial length to 8 seconds. If no response 
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was detected within 8s, this trial was considered as missed and deleted from the 
following analysis.  
TMS procedure 
We used Brainsight (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada), a MR-guided 
neuronavigational device, to guide the magnetic coil position relative to the cortical 
surface. Magnetic stimulation was performed using a high-power Magstim 
SuperRapid2 (Magstim Co., Whitland, Dyfed, UK). A figure-of-eight coil with 
external loop diameters of 7 cm was held over the targeted region. One continuous 
train of theta burst rTMS was applied over the targeted region. The theta bursts 
contained 3 pulses of 50Hz and were repeated at 200 ms intervals for 40s resulting in 
600 pulses in total (Huang et al., 2005). To determine the intensity of stimulation, we 
measured the active motor threshold (AMT) of each subject. Motor evoked potential 
(MEP) was measured by recording the electromyographic (EMG) activity from the 
right FDI muscles. AMT was determined at the minimum intensity of a single pulse 
over the hand area of the left motor cortex that produced a MEP greater than 200 µV 
on five out of ten stimulations while the subject was maintaining a voluntary 
contraction of about 20% of maximum force. Theta burst rTMS was delivered at 80% 
of each individual’s AMT.  
Anatomical sites for TMS were localized on the basis of individual neuroanatomy. A 
T1-weighted 3D anatomical brain scan (1 x 1 x 1 mm resolution) was obtained for 
each subject (TR = 8.1 ms, TE = 3.7 ms, flip angle = 8°) with a 3T Philips Achieva 
scanner. To localize our target area TPJ, we performed reverse normalization, using 
the segmentation and normalization procedures implemented in SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/).  The region of interest (ROI) of a 
5-mm sphere was created on the MNI template using the coordinates (51, -45, 21) 
from a previous study (Hare et. al, 2010) and then reverse normalized to each 
subject’s anatomical brain based on the anatomical parameters from the segmentation.  
Analyses 
In the second step of our analysis, we performed multiple linear regression analyses to 
test our hypotheses. We included the donation amounts (DA) as the dependent 
variable, and the treatment (the site of TMS), the linear term of deservingness ratings, 
and the interaction between treatment and deservingness as independent variables. In 
addition, we included the following control variables: the quadratic term of 
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deservingness, gender, the ratings on closeness, familiarity, and charity age, and the 
scores of SVO, empathy, and personality (including neuroticism, extroversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness). The multiple linear regression formula is 
as follows: 
DAij = ß0 + ß1 × tmsi + ß2 × Deservij + ß3 × tmsi × Deservij + ß4 × Deservij 2 + 
 control variables + eij         (1) 
where  i and j denotes subject index and charity index respectively, and DAij stands 
for donation amount for subject i and charity j, tmsi  for the dummy variable of 
treatment (effect coding,1 for TPJ and 0 for vertex). Deservij denotes rating scores for 
deservingness from subject i for charity j. In control variables, gender and SVO are 
dummy variables (1 for female and 0 for male; 1 for prosocial and 0 for 
individualistic and competitive). All the other variables were standardized (i.e. 
converted into z-scores) before entering the regression analyses. As we have multiple 
observations from each individual, we applied the linear regression with clustered 
standard errors using STATA 11.2 (http://www.stata.com, StataCorp, Texas, USA) to 
control for the within-subject correlations (Rogers, 1993). 
We illustrated predicted donations as a function of perceived deservingness for vertex 
and rTPJ groups based on the results from multiple linear regression (Figure 3). 
According to our multiple linear regression formula (1), the relationship between DA 
and deservingness for the TPJ group (tmsi equals 1) is:   
DAij = ß0 + ß1 + (ß2 + ß3) × Deservij + ß4 × Deservij 2+ eij        (2) 
And for the vertex group (tmsi equals 0) is: 
DAij = ß0 + ß2  × Deservij  + ß4 × Deservij 2 +eij         (3) 
Based on these two formulas, we calculated the predicted average donation amounts 
of each deservingness level for the TPJ and vertex group, respectively. In addition, we 
calculated the standard errors of the predicted average donation amounts through 
bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a method for assigning measures of accuracy to 
sample estimates, which can be implemented by constructing a number of resamples 
of the observed dataset by random sampling with replacement from the original 
dataset (2, 18). Bootstrapping was implemented in STATA 11.2. Standard errors were 
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calculated based on the distributions of the estimated regression coefficients from 
Bootstrapping (repeated for 1000 times). Notably, Figure 3 is produced only for 
illustration purpose. The standard error was calculated based on the multiple linear 
regression formula, which therefore is not directly informative for the significance of 
each regression coefficient (see Table S1 for the statistical details of the regression 
coefficients). 
It is important to point out that as we standardized deservingness into z-scores, the 
constant (ß0) represents the average donation amounts of the Vertex group, ß1 tested 
whether the average donations of the TPJ group is significantly different from the 
Vertex group, ß2 tested the linear dependence of donation amounts on the 
deservingness of the Vertex group, and ß3 tested whether the linear dependence in the 
TPJ group is significantly different from the Vertex group. 
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Figures 
 
Figure S1. Our TMS treatment had no influence on judgments towards charities. 
Disrupting rTPJ activity does not influence the judgments towards charities in any of 
the four dimensions (Pearson’s correlation, r_closeness = .64 for rTPJ and .68 for vertex; 
r_familiarity = .80 for rTPJ and .83 for vertex; r_age = .65 for rTPJ and .63 for vertex; 
tested after Fisher’s r-to-z transformation). 
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Tables and Legend 
 
Table S1. Main effect for our TMS treatment. Below we illustrated results from 
multiple linear regression analysis with the donation amounts as the dependent 
variable, the site of TMS as independent variables and scores from questionnaires as 
control variables. Robust standard errors (clustered at individual level) were reported 
in parentheses. 
 Donation Amount Coefficient (β) 
Effect of Treatment TMS (TPJ) -11.33 
(3.85)* * 
Control variables SVO 9.63 
(4.17)* 
 Female 7.04 
(3.79) 
 Neuroticism -2.87 
(2.55) 
 Extroversion -3.29 
(1.85) 
 Agreeableness 0.42 
(2.55) 
 Conscientiousness -3.50 
(2.36) 
 Openness 6.60 
(2.33) * * 
 Empathy -0.16 
  (2.58) 
Constant  19.57 
(3.42)*** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
R-squared   = 0.18 
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Table S2. Treatment effects on the willingness to donate. Below we illustrated results 
from multiple linear regression analysis with the donation amounts as the dependent 
variable, the site of TMS, the linear term of deservingness and the interaction term 
between deservingness and TMS as independent variables and other scores as control 
variables. Robust standard errors (clustered at individual level) were reported in 
parentheses. 
 Donation Amount Coefficient (β) 
Effect of Treatment TMS (TPJ) -8.02 
(3.93)* 
Effect of Deservingness Deservingness 12.77 
(1.77)*** 
Interaction between TMS and Deservingness TMS * Deservingness -5.16 
(2.48)* 
Control variables Quadratic Deservingness 0.58 
  (0.74) 
 Closeness 2.54 
(1.03)* 
 Familarity 0.23 
(0.91) 
 Age 0.00 
(0.74) 
 SVO 9.36 
(4.17)* 
 Female 4.71 
(3.80) 
 Neuroticism -2.90 
(2.50) 
 Extroversion -3.34 
(1.77) 
 Agreeableness 1.31 
(2.65) 
 Conscientiousness -1.96 
(2.23) 
 Openness 5.37 
(2.45)* 
 Empathy -1.66 
  (2.70) 
Constant  18.91 
(3.35)*** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
R-squared   = 0.40 
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Table S3. Treatment effects on willingness to donate for the Human-charity. Below 
we illustrated results from multiple linear regression analysis for the Human-charity 
with the donation amounts as the dependent variable, the site of TMS, the linear term 
of deservingness and the interaction term between deservingness and TMS as 
independent variables and other scores as control variables. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at individual level) were reported in parentheses. 
 Donation Amount Coefficient (β) 
Effect of Treatment TMS (TPJ) -8.63 
(4.17)* 
Effect of Deservingness Deservingness 12.76 
(1.83)*** 
Interaction between TMS and 
Deservingness 
TMS * Deservingness -6.36 
(2.70)* 
Control variables Quadratic Deservingness 0.27 
  (0.91) 
 Closeness 2.37 
(1.07)* 
 Familarity -0.16 
(0.82) 
 Age 0.46 
(0.88) 
 SVO 10.00 
(4.58)* 
 Female 5.77 
(4.25) 
 Neuroticism -3.45 
(2.69) 
 Extroversion -3.95 
(1.94) 
 Agreeableness 1.25 
(2.79) 
 Conscientiousness -2.51 
(2.43) 
 Openness 6.19 
(2.67)* 
 Empathy -1.74 
  (2.81) 
Constant  18.04 
(3.89)*** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
R-squared   = 0.39 
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Table S4. Treatment effects on willingness to donate for the Non-human-charity. 
Below we illustrated results from multiple linear regression analysis for the Human-
charity with the donation amounts as the dependent variable, the site of TMS, the 
linear term of deservingness and the interaction term between deservingness and TMS 
as independent variables and other scores as control variables. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at individual level) were reported in parentheses. 
 Donation Amount Coefficient (β) 
Effect of Treatment TMS (TPJ) -5.28 
(4.03) 
Effect of Deservingness Deservingness 11.44 
(1.91)*** 
Interaction between TMS and 
Deservingness 
TMS * Deservingness -1.76 
(2.68) 
Control variables Quadratic Deservingness 1.76 
  (0.81) 
 Closeness 2.91 
(1.17)* 
 Familarity 1.02 
(0.86) 
 Age -0.36 
(0.69) 
 SVO 7.08 
(3.38)* 
 Female 2.14 
(3.04) 
 Neuroticism -1.49 
(2.22) 
 Extroversion -1.71 
(1.50) 
 Agreeableness 1.42 
(2.31) 
 Conscientiousness -0.67 
(1.89) 
 Openness 3.30 
(2.16) 
 Empathy -1.25 
  (2.52) 
Constant  11.60 
(4.74)*** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
R-squared   = 0.45 
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Table S5: Coefficients from the linear regression analyses for testing the change of 
ratings (post- vs. pre- TMS) in four dimensions (deservingness, closeness, familiarity 
and age) as a function of treatment group (the site of TMS). Robust standard errors 
were reported in parentheses. The results showed that the change of ratings didn’t 
differ between the TPJ and vertex groups in any of the four dimensions. 
 Change of 
deservingness 
Change of 
closeness 
Change of 
familiarity 
Change of 
age 
Treatment 
(TPJ vs. vertex) 
0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.004 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
Table S6: Coefficients from the linear regression analyses for testing the change of 
mood (post- vs. pre- TMS) in three subscales (good-bad, awake-tired, calm-nervous) 
as a function of treatment group. Robust standard errors were reported in parentheses. 
The results showed that the change of mood didn’t differ between the TPJ and vertex 
groups in any of the three subscales. 
 Good-bad Awake-tired Calm-nervous 
Treatment 
(TPJ vs. vertex) 
-0.09 -0.09 0.02 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09) 
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Experiment Instruction 
Anleitung 
Bitte beachten Sie: Sollte etwas unklar sein, melden Sie sich bitte bei uns. Wir 
werden es Ihnen dann gerne erklären.  
Vielen Dank, dass Sie unsere Forschung unterstützen. In dieser Studie würden wir 
gerne Ihre Meinung über 70 verschiedene Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen wissen. Diese 
sind als gemeinnützig anerkannt und national oder international tätig. 
Das Experiment besteht aus drei Teilen. Im ersten Teil wird Ihnen eine Liste der 
Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen mit einer kurzen Beschreibung jeder Organisation 
gezeigt. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen in Bezug auf mehrere 
Kriterien zu bewerten.  
Im zweiten Teil werden wir Ihnen einige der Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen aus dem 
ersten Teil erneut darbieten und Sie bitten, Entscheidungen im Zusammenhang mit 
diesen Organisationen zu treffen.  
Beginnen Sie mit Teil 1. Wenn Sie mit Teil 1 fertig sind, können Sie mit dem zweiten 
Teil fortfahren. Im Anschluss wird Ihnen ein kurzer dritter Teil präsentiert werden. 
 
Teil 1 
Im ersten Teil werden Sie Bilder wie das folgende auf Ihrem Monitor sehen:  
 
Name, Hauptaufgabe und eine kurze Beschreibung der Wohltätigkeitsorganisation 
werden in drei verschiedenen Farben angezeigt: Der Name in GELB, die 
Hauptaufgabe in ROT und die Beschreibung in WEISS. Unter der Beschreibung der 
Organisation sehen Sie Ihre Aufgabe.  
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Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die Organisationen in Hinblick auf die folgenden vier Aspekte zu 
bewerten. Die Aspekte werden in zufälliger Reihenfolge präsentiert. 
-­‐ Verdient Unterstützung 
Wie sehr verdient es die Organisation, unterstützt zu werden?  
-­‐ Nähe 
Wie gross ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Sie selbst - oder jemand, den 
Sie kennen - von der Organisation direkt profitieren könnten? 
-­‐ Bekanntheit 
Wie bekannt ist diese Organisation? Haben Sie beispielsweise jemals von 
dieser Organisation gehört oder etwas über sie erfahren?  
-­‐ Alter der Organisation 
Für wie alt schätzen Sie die Organisation ein?  
 
Sie können diese Informationen über die Bewertungsaspekte auf dem Beiblatt finden. 
Greifen Sie bitte während dem Lösen der Aufgabe auf das Beiblatt zurück, wann 
immer Sie die Definition für einen der fünf Bewertungsaspekte brauchen.  
 
Die Bewertungsaspekte erscheinen jeweils in GELB unter der Beschreibung der 
Organisation, zusammen mit einer Fünf-Punkte-Skala. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die 
Organisation auf einen Aspekt hin zu bewerten.  
Wenn Sie zum Beispiel dieses Bild sehen…  
 
…dann müssen Sie bewerten, wie sehr die Wohltätigkeitsorganisation Unterstützung 
verdient.  
Falls Sie der Meinung sind, dass die Organisation überhaupt nicht unterstützt werden 
sollte, wählen Sie „1“ auf Ihrer Tastatur. Falls Sie finden, die Organisation verdient 
sehr grosse Unterstützung, drücken Sie „5“ auf Ihrer Tastatur.  
Wenn Sie eine Zahl gewählt haben, wird diese auf dem Bildschirm rot erscheinen. 
Daraufhin wird die nächste Organisation zur Bewertung dargeboten. Nachdem Sie 
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alle Organisationen in Hinblick auf einen Aspekt bewertet haben, werden Sie die 
Organisationen erneut bezüglich des nächsten Aspekts bewerten.  
Wenn Sie im folgenden Durchgang also zum Beispiel dieses Bild sehen… 
 
… müssen Sie bewerten, wie nahe Sie dieser Organisation stehen, also wie gross die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit ist, dass Sie selbst – oder jemand den Sie kennen – von der 
Organisation profitieren könnten.  
Die Skala ist für jeden Aspekt gleich (1 für ÜBERHAUPT NICHT, 5 für SEHR), 
ausser für den Aspekt Alter.  
Um das Alter zu schätzen, werden Sie die folgende Skala sehen:  
 
Die Angaben unter der Fünf-Punkte-Skala geben den Altersbereich an: „<10“ heisst 
„jünger als 10 Jahre“, „11-40“ bedeutet, das Alter der Organisation liegt zwischen 11 
und 40 Jahren, und so weiter.  
Wenn Sie also beispielsweise glauben, dass das Alter einer bestimmten 
Wohltätigkeitsorganisation UNTER 10 JAHREN liegt, dann drücken Sie „1“.Wenn 
Sie glauben, das Alter der Organisation ist grösser als 100 JAHRE, dann drücken Sie 
„5“. Wenn Sie glauben, das Alter einer Organisation liegt im Bereich ZWISCHEN 41 
UND 70 JAHREN, drücken Sie „3“.  
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Bitte beachten Sie:  
1. Bitte lesen Sie die Hauptaufgabe und die kurze Beschreibung aller 
Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen äusserst sorgfältig und versuchen Sie, sich die 
Hauptaufgabe jeder Organisation zu merken. Sie werden diese Informationen 
in Teil 2 benötigen. Bitte sehen Sie jedoch davon ab, sich Notizen zu machen, 
eine sorgfältige Lektüre ist völlig ausreichend. 
2. Wenn Sie die jeweilige Zahl eingegeben haben, können Sie diese nicht mehr 
ändern. Achten Sie deshalb darauf, dass Ihre Finger richtig auf der Tastatur 
platziert sind und Sie keine falschen Zahlen eingeben. 
 
Wenn Sie irgendwelche Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an die Versuchsleiterin. 
Wenn Sie keine Fragen haben, drücken Sie bitte Taste „s“, um zu beginnen. Sie 
werden am Anfang einige Organisationen nur zur Übung bewerten, damit Ihnen der 
Ablauf der Aufgabe und die Eingabemöglichkeiten klar werden. Wenn Sie nach der 
Übung Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an die Versuchsleiterin. Wenn Sie keine 
Fragen haben, können Sie den Hauptteil starten, indem Sie die Taste „s“ drücken. 
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Teil 2 
Wir kommen nun zum zweiten Teil des Experiments. In diesem Teil werden Ihnen 
verschiedene Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen gezeigt, die Sie im ersten Teil bewertet 
haben.  
Ihre Aufgabe ist es nun, zu entscheiden, welchen Betrag Sie der 
Wohltätigkeitsorganisation spenden wollen. 
Zu diesem Zweck erhalten Sie 100 Punkte, von denen jeder Punkt 0,5 CHF wert ist. 
Sie müssen entscheiden, wie viele der 100 Punkte Sie der Organisation geben wollen. 
 
Um ihre Entscheidung treffen zu können, werden wir Ihnen den Namen und die 
Hauptaufgabe der Organisationen mitteilen. Unten sehen Sie ein Beispiel. Sie werden 
den Namen der Organisation in GELB und die Hauptaufgabe in ROT sehen.  
 
 
Am Ende des Experiments wird eine Wohltätigkeitsorganisation zufällig ausgewählt 
und Ihre Entscheidung bezüglich dieser Organisation wird umgesetzt. Dies heisst, 
dass Ihre Spende anonym an die Organisation gespendet wird. Sie werden eine 
schriftliche Bestätigung über die Spende erhalten, sobald diese bei der Organisation 
eingegangen ist. Deshalb ist es wichtig, dass Sie eine unabhängige Entscheidung für 
jede einzelne Wohltätigkeitsorganisation treffen, da am Schluss nur eine Ihrer 
Entscheidungen zählen wird. Gleichzeitig müssen Sie sich jede Entscheidung 
ernsthaft überlegen, da jede Organisation am Ende zufällig gewählt werden kann. 
Wenn Sie sich zum Beispiel entscheiden, 35 Punkte an die Organisation X zu 
spenden, und Organisation X am Schluss des Experiments zufällig gewählt wird, dann 
bezahlen Sie 35 Punkte an die Organisation X und können die restlichen 65 Punkte 
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für sich behalten. Da jeder Punkt 0.5 CHF wert ist, spenden Sie 17.5 CHF an 
Organisation X und erhalten selbst 32.5 CHF (zusätzlich zur Erscheinungsvergütung 
von 15 CHF).  
Sie können die Anzahl Punkte, die Sie der jeweiligen Organisation spenden wollen, in 
die Box unter dem Wort „Spenden?“ eintragen. 
 
Bitte benutzen Sie die Zahltasten auf Ihrer Tastatur, um die Anzahl der Punkte 
einzutragen.  
Falls Sie versehentlich eine falsche Zahl eingeben haben oder Ihre Entscheidung 
ändern wollen, können Sie die eingegebene Zahl durch eine neue Zahl ersetzen. In 
diesem Fall müssen Sie eine dreistellige Zahl eingeben. Wenn Sie zum Beispiel 60 
Punkte spenden wollen, aber „80“ eingegeben haben, können Sie dies korrigieren, 
indem sie „060“ eingeben. 
Nach genau 8 Sekunden wird Ihnen die nächste Organisation vorgelegt werden, 
unabhängig davon, ob Sie eine Eingabe gemacht haben, oder nicht. 
Wenn Ihre Entscheidung bestätigt ist, werden als Rückmeldung sowohl die Zahl als 
auch die Box in Rot erscheinen.  
 
Bitte beachten Sie: 
1. Die Spenden sollten innerhalb des Bereichs von 0 bis 100 Punkten eingegeben 
werden.  
2. Sollte die eingegebene Zahl dieses Limit überschreiten, können Sie nicht 
fortfahren, bevor die Zahl nicht im Rahmen der Anweisungen geändert wurde.  
3. Nach 8 Sekunden wird Ihnen die nächste Wohltätigkeitsorganisation vorgelegt 
werden. 
4. Bitte beachten Sie, dass jede Ihrer Entscheidungen Konsequenzen haben 
kann, da Ihre gewählte Spende Ihre Auszahlung beinflusst und an die 
betreffende Organisation überwiesen werden wird, wenn diese Organisation 
am Ende gewählt wird.   
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Um sicherzustellen, dass Sie die Aufgabe verstanden haben, beantworten Sie bitte die 
folgenden Fragen:   
Wenn Sie 40 Punkte an die Wohltätigkeitsorganisation gespendet haben und diese 
Entscheidung am Schluss zufällig aus gewählt wird,    
1) Wie viele Franken erhalten Sie dann selber (inklusive der Vergütung für die 
Teilnahme am Experiment)? 
 
 
2)  Wie viele Franken erhält dann die Wohltätigkeitsorganisation?  
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Teil 3 
Wir kommen nun zum dritten und letzten Teil des Experiments. In diesem Teil 
werden Sie dieselbe Aufgabe wie in Teil 1 bearbeiten; allerdings werden Ihnen nun 
nur noch 35 Organisationen präsentiert werden und Sie werden wie in Teil 2 jeweils 8 
Sekunden Zeit haben, um Ihre Antwort einzugeben. Für die Bearbeitung dieses Teils 
des Experiments werden Ihnen pauschal 10 CHF ausgezahlt. 
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Experiment protocol 
 
Procedure: 
-­‐ Ask subjects to complete the online questionnaires before they come by the 
lab. 
-­‐ Ask subjects to read instructions and sign the consent form before the 
experiment. 
-­‐ Check the control questions and make sure subjects understand the task. 
-­‐ Subjects are asked to complete part1, the charity-evaluation task. 
-­‐ Subjects are asked to complete MDBF. 
-­‐ The experimenters measure the motor threshold of subjects and determine the 
stimulation intensity. 
-­‐ Theta burst TMS stimulation is implemented. 
-­‐ Subjects complete the donation task and the re-evaluation of charity task. 
-­‐ Subjects are asked to fill out the MDBF for a second time. 
More details: 
 
Preparation before subjects arrive 
 
TMS devices  
1) Goggle 
2) Subject tracker/ Coil tracker 
3) Screw driver (attach subject tracker to the goggle & coil tracker 
to the coil) 
4) Coil calibration block (set the heights of three piles evenly) 
5) Remote control 
6) TMS device power on/ change the cable attached to the 
monitor 
7) MEP, check the cable connection, prepare tapes, electrodes, 
and alcohol pads. 
8) earplugs 
9) chin-rest 
10) make sure the right coil is attached 
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BrainSight  
1) Turn on the Mac 
2) Turn on the camera 
3) Check the cables of MEP devices 
4) Start BrainSight 
5) Things to prepare in advance 
a. Skin/ Curvilinear brain 
b. References (nosetip, nasion, left/right ear) 
c. Targets (M1 & right TPJ) 
d. Coil calibration 
Program: 
 Turn on the presenting computer. Start the pre-rating program.  
 Instructions: 
1) TMS ethics (two files); 
2) Descriptions for TMS (general) and the overview of our study; 
3) Instruction for our study; 
4) Questionnaires. 
5) SubjectsLog 
 
After subject arrive 
1) Welcome subjects; introduce ourselves  
2) Subject will be seated in the kitchen.  
3) The experimenter delivers the description of TMS (one file) and ethics (3 
miles) to subjects, ask them to read and sign.  
4) The experimenter delivers the instruction of Part 1, answer subjects’ 
questions and then start the practice session for Part 1. 
5) The experimenter starts the session of Part 1.  
6) After Part I, The experimenter delivers the instruction for Part 2&3. Ask 
whether subjects have questions. Then start the practice session for part 2. 
7) The experimenter asks subjects to fill out the MDBF questionnaire. 
8)  Determine motor threshold: 
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3. Goggle – fix it on the subject’s head with tapes. 
4. Adjust the chin rest. Give earplugs to everyone.  
5. Skin preparation for MEP  
- Swap the skin with Alcohol pad 
- Attach electrodes (ground, positive, negative) 
- Connect wire 
 
6. Identify the threshold intensity 
Theta Burst protocol  
1. Change the coil 
2. Use Manfrotto to fix coil 
3. Go to Magstim GUI   
1) Select repetitive mode  
2) Select burst mode 
3) N.of Pulses: 3 
4) Frequency: 50 Hz 
5) Burst frequency: 5Hz (repeating every 200ms) 
6) N. of bursts: 200 (600 in total) 
7) Total time: 40 sec 
7. Apply theta-burst TMS. 
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Appendix  
B. Neural Correlates of Learning Rate in a Changing 
Environment 
 
This chapter is joint work with Ernst Fehr, Kerstin Preuschoff and Yosuke Morishima
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Neural Correlates of the Learning Rate in a Changing Environment 
Chaohui Guo, Yosuke Morishima, Kerstin Preuschoff *, Ernst Fehr * 
 
Abstract 
 
Our interactions with the environment always involve imperfect observations. 
Updating beliefs correctly based on new observations is central to learning  behavior. 
The learning rate (LR) is a fundamental parameter in reinforcement learning models 
that represents the weight given to new information. However, the neural substrates 
that encode the LR still remain unclear. Locus coeruleus (LC) has been proposed as 
the core component of the neural network of learning under uncertainty, and it has 
been proposed to have sophisticated regulation function in learning under uncertainty. 
There has also been indirect evidence that associates the functional activity of LC 
with the LR, while the direct empirical evidence is still missing. Here we find that 
participants’ LRs vary according to local statistical features: (i) The LR is lower in 
contexts with a higher noise level, and (ii) The LR is higher in contexts with a 
changing mean and a stable noise level (a relevant change) compared to contexts with 
a stable mean and a changing noise level (an irrelevant change). Furthermore, we find 
that the adaptive LR is positively correlated with the functional activity of a region in 
pons, consistent with the position of locus coeruleus (LC), at the individual level, 
providing the first direct empirical evidence for the link between functional activity of 
LC and the computationally complex function of adaptively weighting new 
information based on the local contexts. 
 
 
Key words: Locus coeruleus, learning rate, volatility, noise level, ACC 
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Introduction 
 
Our interactions with the environment, from naturalist navigation to human social 
interactions, always involve various changes. The ability to infer the altered state of 
the world based on imperfect observations is crucial for optimal responses. For 
example, foraging animals need to evaluate the quality of a dynamic food patch 
according to the amount of food acquired in the past, and investors have to estimate 
the value of a stock based on its daily prices and other available information. 
Reinforcement learning (RL) theory has been proven to be effective in describing 
important forms of learning behavior and the corresponding neuronal activity (Schultz 
& Dickinson 2000; Schultz et al. 1997; Tobler et al. 2005; M. X. Cohen 2008; Niv et 
al. 2012; Glascher et al. 2010; O'Doherty et al. 2003). In such models, an agent 
updates beliefs in proportion to the prediction error (PE), defined as the difference 
between the actual and the expected outcome. A fundamental parameter, the learning 
rate (LR) reflects the weight given to new observations and regulates the relative 
contribution of outcome history and new observations on beliefs, e.g. a higher LR 
leads to a stronger influence of new observations on beliefs (Rescorla & Wagner 
1972; Sutton & Barto 1998).  
Classical reinforcement learning studies have been focused on learning behavior in 
stationary environments and often assumed that the LR is a constant for the whole 
period. It is unclear how LRs are adapted in environments where the underlying 
distribution can change abruptly, and which neural substrates encode the LR. In this 
study, we aim to address these questions through a mean-guessing task, in which 
participants are asked to make trial-by-trial inferences of the mean of the underlying 
distribution based on previous observations. In our paradigm, the change of the 
environment can either be a change of the mean or a change of the noise level. Based 
on previous theoretical and empirical studies (Preuschoff & Bossaerts 2007; Behrens 
et al. 2007; Nassar et al. 2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al. 2013; Chumbley et.al, 2011), 
we hypothesize that the LR will be higher (i) when the mean changes compared to 
situations where the mean does not change and (ii) in an environment characterized 
by a lower noise level.    
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Previous research provides us with insights into the neural substrates that are involved 
in the LR encoding. Yu & Dayan (2005) propose that the neurotransmitter 
noradrenaline signals unexpected uncertainty and facilitates adaptation to changes. 
Locus coeruleus (LC) is the sole source of noradrenaline, which is hypothetically the 
core component of the neural network of learning under uncertainty. A recent fMRI 
study demonstrates that the functional activity of LC represents the unexpected 
uncertainty (Payzan-LeNestour et al. 2013). Similarly, Aston-Jones et al. (2007) 
provides solid evidence that links LC to a computationally sophisticated “regulation 
function” in learning under uncertainty. Pupil diameters have been shown to 
positively correlate with computational variables representing LR (Nassar et al. 
2012). Combined with the findings that pupil dilation is a reliable measure of LC 
activity (Phillips et al. 2000), this study provides indirect empirical evidence linking 
LC with the encoding of LR, while the direct empirical evidence is still missing.  
In addition to LC, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is considered important in 
adaptive behavior. It has been implicated in many cognitive functions including 
arousal, attention, motivation, working memory, response inhibition, and behavioral 
flexibility (Carter & van Veen 2007; van Veen et al. 2001; Carter et al. 1998; 
Botvinick et al. 2004; Paus 2001; Carter et al. 1999). Moreover, the activity of ACC 
has been found to correlate with certain statistical features of environments, such as 
the average reward rate (Amiez et al. 2006), and the volatility (Behrens et al. 2007). 
Particularly, the functional activity of ACC have been associated with the 
heterogeneity of average LRs across subjects (Behrens et al. 2007). However, so far 
there is no direct evidence that associates the functional activity of ACC with trial-by-
trial LR at the individual level. In this study, we examine whether the functional 
activity of LC and ACC are associated with the LR in changing environments. 
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Materials and Methods 
 
Subjects 
Twenty healthy subjects (10 female; 19-27 years old) with no history of neurological 
or psychiatric illness participated in our task. One subject was excluded from the final 
analysis because this subject had difficulty in understanding the task (details in 
supplementary). The study was approved by the ethical committee of Canton Zurich. 
Written informed consents were obtained from all participants. 
Behavioral paradigm 
Our mean-guessing task investigates adaptive learning in changing environments. In 
this task, random numbers were generated from a hidden Gaussian distribution (N (û, 
σ)) whose mean (û) and standard deviation (σ) abruptly changed. Subjects were 
presented with one realization (observation) on each trial and were asked to report 
their trial-by-trial estimations of the underlying mean (û) based on the previous 
observations. All observations and the underlying means were ranged within 0 to 100. 
Each trial consisted of three stages: guess, confirmation and new observation, see 
Figure 1A. Subjects reported their estimations by placing a square on a slider ranged 
from 0 to 100, then pressing a button to confirm their guess. There was a maximum of 
10s response time. If no confirmation was detected, the last position of the square was 
accepted as the guess for this trial. Afterwards, a new observation was provided and 
displayed for 1.5s. Based on this new observation subjects could update their beliefs 
and be in preparation for the next trial. Inter-trial-interval (ITI) was displayed as a 
blank screen with a fixation at the centre for 2-6 s (uniform distribution), followed by 
the next trial. Stimuli were presented using psychotoolbox-3 running in MATLAB. 
Each subject completed four sessions of 60 trials in each session in the scanner. In all 
sessions, the noise level changed multiple times, i.e., the noise level was always 
volatile. The four sessions differed in either the volatility of the mean or the initial 
noise level, resulting in four session types: Type I, with stable mean and high initial 
noise level (an example in Figure S1); Type II, with stable mean and low initial noise 
level; Type III, with changing mean and high initial noise level (Figure 1B); Type IV, 
with changing mean and low initial noise level. Presenting orders of the four sessions 
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were randomized across subjects. Subjects were informed that the underlying mean 
and observations were within 0 to 100, and the mean and noise level could both 
change unexpectedly, but independently of each other, for multiple times over each 
session. Notably, subjects were not informed of the type of sessions or the changes of 
the underlying distributions, and they could only infer these from the observations 
they received. More details are described in the supplementary material. 
The absolute error for each trial was calculated as the distance between the guessed 
number and the true underlying mean. At the end of each session, we calculated a 
performance score by averaging over the absolute error of every trial from the second 
to last trial and then presented this to subjects. At the end of the experiment, only one 
session was randomly chosen and the score of this session determined subjects’ 
payment, i.e. payment was scaled inversely with average error (AE) of this randomly 
chosen session (maximum CHF 120 when AE is 0 and minimum CHF 55 when AE is 
over 10; Details were illustrated in Table S1).  
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A. 
 
B.  
 
Figure 1. A. Schematized trial of the mean-guessing task. On each trial, subjects were 
asked to report their trial-by-trial estimations of the underlying mean of a Gaussian 
distribution (blue line in B) based on an observation drawn from the underlying 
distribution by adjusting the position of a square on a slider. The initial position of the 
square was randomized on each trial (green square in A). B. An example session with 
a changing mean. The solid blue line represents the underlying mean, which remained 
unknown to subjects and had to be guessed. Black dashed lines illustrate the standard 
deviation (SD) of the underlying distribution, which changed independently of the 
mean. The green line represents the samples drawn from the underlying distributions. 
Red dots were the guesses of a subject. Notably, the mean and SD could suddenly 
change but subjects could only infer that from the observations they received. 
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Behavioral Data Analysis 
The LR is traditionally assumed to be a constant and is estimated through linear least 
squares regression in classical reinforcement learning studies where the environment 
is stable over time. However, such an assumption becomes inappropriate in our 
setting because here the environment changes periodically, which should lead to 
changes in the LR (Preuschoff & Bossaerts 2007; Behrens et al. 2007; Nassar et al. 
2010; Payzan-LeNestour et al. 2013). As we aim to investigate whether and how 
humans adjust their LR based on the local statistical features (i.e. volatility of the 
mean and the magnitude of the noise level), we estimated the average LR for each 
short period with stable statistical features. We define an epoch as all trials between 
one change and the next change. Each session consists of multiple epochs.
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We define:  
Term Meaning Value Range  
t trial index [1, 60] 
n total number of epochs in a session [5, 9] 
i epoch index [1, n] 
ût guessed number at trial t [0, 100] 
st observation at trial t [0, 100] 
bit dummy variable to identify whether trial t belongs 
to epoch i 
= 1, if trial t belongs to epoch i,  
= 0, otherwise 
δt prediction error at trial t  
αi average LR for epoch i (we label it as the tonic 
component of the LR) 
 
βt trial-wise adjustment component of the LR on the 
basis of αi (we label it as the transient component of 
the LR) 
 
et residual term of the linear regression  
 
We estimated the LR based on the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) rule of reinforcement 
learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). First, we estimated the average LR for epoch i 
(αi) through linear least squares regression based on formula (1). 
ût+1 – ût = 𝛼!   ×  𝑏!"×𝛿!!!!! + et       (1) 
We calculated the prediction error (δt) as the deviation of the new observation from 
the guessed number, namely: 
δt = st – ût          (2) 
The residual term et  in formula (1) contains the trial-wise variance of a subject’s 
belief updates that cannot be explained by the epoch-wise average LR (αi). We 
defined a second parameter, βt , to represent the trial-based adjustment component of 
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the LR on the basis of α.  Based on the RW rule, we explained the trial-wise variance 
of belief updates through formula (3).  
et = βt  × δt             (3) 
Based on formula (3), we estimated βt through linear least squares regression (see 
supplementary material for details). 
Next, we classified the epochs into different types based on the volatility of the mean 
and magnitude of the noise level. The first two types are: FirstL, the starting epoch of 
a session and with a low noise level; FirstH, the starting epoch of a session and with a 
high noise level. These two types of epochs both have stable mean, and they only 
differ in the magnitude of noise level, allowing us to test whether the LR is adjusted 
to the noise level. Additionally, two other types of epochs enable us to test whether 
subjects can distinguish between situations with a change of the mean and constant 
noise level (where a high LR is required to respond to the change) and those with a 
change of the noise level and constant mean (a low LR is required as the mean still 
remains the same): Mean-Stable, the epoch during which the mean remains the same 
as the previous epoch while the noise level changes; Mean-Volatile, the epoch with a 
changed mean compared to the previous epoch while the noise level remains constant 
(Details are illustrated in supplementary material). 
FMRI Data Acquisition 
Data were acquired with a 3T Philips Achieva scanner. High-resolution structural T1-
weighted 3D-TFE anatomical scans of the whole brain were also acquired for each 
participant, with voxel size 1.1×1.1×0.6 mm, TR = 7.5 ms, TE = 3.5 ms, flip angle = 
8°. Functional images were taken with a T2-weighted gradient Echo-Planar Imaging 
sequence (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 36 ms, flip angle = 90 degrees). Whole brain coverage 
was achieved by 37 slices in ascending order (3 mm thickness, 0.5 mm gap, in-plane 
voxel size 2 x 2 mm). Subjects' head was restrained with foam pads to decrease head 
movement. Functional imaging data were acquired in four separate sessions, each 
lasting about 10 minutes.  
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FMRI Data Analysis 
We performed our image analysis using SPM8 in Matlab  
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). EPI images were realigned to the 
first volume and co-registered with the anatomical scan. Subjects’ T1 images were 
segmented into gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid and the 
segmentation parameters were used to warp the T1 images to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) template. Functional data were then normalized to the 
MNI template based on the output parameters from segmentation. Afterwards, the 
normalized images were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 6mm full-width-half-
maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. Sessions with extensive head movements 
(larger than 3 degrees and 4mm) were excluded from the following analysis (i.e. one 
session was excluded for two subjects). 
A general linear model (GLM) was constructed for each subject to estimate 
experimental effects. The model included three events time-locked to each of the 
three stages in each trial: guess, confirmation and new observation. Subjects received 
new information at the observation stage, which should be a crucial time for the LR 
and belief updating. To identify the neural correlates for the LR, we included the 
epoch-wise LR (αi) and the trial-by-trial adjustment component of the LR (βt) as two 
parametric modulators of the observation regressor. To test whether the LR was still 
represented in BOLD responses at the guess stage, we also included αi and βt as 
parametric modulators of the guess regressor. Notably, for each trial, the LR in the 
guess stage was different from the LR in the observation stage. Instead, they reflected 
the LR from the previous observation stage. We included the guessed number as a 
parametric modulator in the confirmation stage. All regressors of interest were 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. We included the six 
estimated head movement parameters as regressors of no interest. All images were 
high-pass filtered in the temporal domain (width 128s) and autocorrelation of the 
hemodynamic response was modelled as an AR(1) process.  
Main effects for the regressors of our interest were estimated at the individual-level. 
Contrast images were taken further to group level analysis. Significant effects were 
tested with one-sample t tests across the group. To identify significant clusters, we 
used a threshold of p<0.001. Correction for multiple comparisons [familywise error 
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(FWE), p < 0.05] was performed at the cluster level. For our a priori region, the locus 
coeruleus (LC), we used small-volume correction (FWE, p<0.05) for 6 mm spheres 
surrounding the average anatomical localization of the human LC [(-4, -37, -26) from 
(Keren et al. 2009). 
Results 
 
Learning rates were adapted to the volatility and noise level  
To address our question whether and how humans adjust their LRs based on the 
volatility of the mean and magnitude of the noise level of the local context, we 
focused on αi, the average LR of epoch i and compared between αi of different types 
of epochs. First, we found that αi in the FirstH epoch was significantly lower than in 
the FirstL epoch (paired t (18) = 3.75, p< 0.01; Figure 2A), supporting our hypothesis 
that subjects’ LRs are lower in periods with a higher noise level, namely that subjects 
assign a lower weight to the new observations in updating their beliefs when the noise 
level is higher. Second, we found that αi in the Mean-Volatile epochs (where mean 
changed compared to the previous epoch while the noise level remained constant) was 
significantly higher than in the Mean-Stable epochs (where mean remains the same as 
the previous epoch while the noise level changes) (paired t (18) = 3.36, p< 0.01; 
Figure 2B), suggesting that subjects distinguish the relevant change from irrelevant 
change of the environment and their LRs are higher in the situation with relevant 
changes.   
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A.                                                                       B. 
 
Figure 2. Behavioral effects of the learning rate. A. The epoch-wise LR, alpha is 
significantly higher in epochs with a lower noise level (paired t-test on alpha of FirstL 
and FirstH epochs, t-value = 3.75; p<0.01), supporting our hypothesis that subjects’ 
LRs are lower in periods with a higher noise level, namely that subjects assign a 
lower weight to the new observations in updating their beliefs when the noise level is 
higher. FirstL, the starting epoch of a session and with a lower noise level; FirstH, the 
starting epoch of a session and with a higher noise level. B. Alpha of the Mean-
Volatile epoch (labelled as Volatile in the figure) is higher than alpha of the Mean-
Stable (labelled as Stable) epochs (paired t-test on alpha of these two types of epochs, 
t-value = 3.36; p<0.01), suggesting that subjects distinguish the relevant change from 
irrelevant change of the environment and the LR is higher in situations with relevant 
changes.  Mean-Stable, the epoch during which the mean remains the same as the 
previous epoch while the noise level changes; Mean-Volatile, the epoch with a 
changed mean compared to the previous epoch while the noise level remains constant 
(Details are illustrated in supplementary material). 
 
 
Neural Correlates for the learning rate 
In order to identify the neural substrates that are involved in the encoding of LR, we 
focused on the observation stage, the crucial period for the LR and belief updating 
because of the arrival of a new observation. We searched for brain areas in which 
activity correlated with the tonic and transient component of the LR: αi and βt, 
respectively.  
First, consistent with our hypothesis, we found significant correlations between αi and 
the functional activity in the pons, a position consistent with locus coeruleus (LC) 
[peak at (-6, -30, -24), t = 4.59, p< 0.05, FWE small-volume corrected; Figure. 3A]. 
*"
*"
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Moreover, significant correlations (p < 0.05, FWE cluster corrected) were also found 
in the left insula (INS) [left BA48, peak at (-44, 16, 0), t = 5.68; Figure 3A], and the 
left pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) [left BA 6, peak at (-6, 10, 52), t = 5.19; 
Figure 3A].  
Second, we found significant correlations between βt and the functional activity in 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) [right BA32, peak at (4, 44, 22), t = 4.48, p < 0.05 at 
the cluster level; Figure 3B], and in right inferior frontal cortex (IFC)[right BA45, 
peak at (56, 24, 6), t = 4.59, p < 0.05, FWE cluster corrected; Figure 3B].  
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A. 
 
B. 
 
Figure 3. Neural correlates of the learning rate. A. The average LR of epoch i, αi, is 
positively correlated with the activity in the pons, a position consistent with LC, and 
the activity in preSMA and left insula (INS). B. The trial-by-trial adjustment 
component of the LR, βt, is positively correlated with the activity in ACC and right 
IFG, extending to right insula (clusters in A, B are sig. at p<0.001, but shown at 
p<0.005). 
 
Y = -27! X = -2!
Z = -24! X = -38!
LC!
preSMA!
INS!
X = 6! X = 48!
ACC!
IFG!
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In the supplementary material, we report the activations for the guess, confirmation, 
and new observation stage, and neural correlates for the parametric modulators of the 
guess and confirmation stage.  
Discussion 
 
In this fMRI study we investigate whether and how the LR is adjusted based on the 
local statistical features in a changing environment and the neural mechanisms 
involved in the encoding of the LR. We find that the average LR of each epoch (αi) 
differs between various contexts: First, αi is lower in contexts with a higher noise 
level, supporting our hypothesis that a lower weight is assigned to the new 
information when subjects update their beliefs in contexts characterized by a higher 
noise level; second, αi is higher in contexts with a changing mean and a stable noise 
level (a relevant change) compared to contexts with a stable mean and a changing 
noise level (an irrelevant change), suggesting that subjects distinguish the relevant 
change from irrelevant change of the environment and their LRs are higher in the 
contexts with relevant changes.  Moreover, we find that the average LR of each epoch 
(αi) is positively correlated with the functional activity in the pons, a position 
consistent with the location of LC, and in the left INS and preSMA. Furthermore, we 
find that the functional activity of a different set of regions, including ACC and RIFG, 
are positively correlated with βt, the trial-by-trial adjustment component of the LR on 
the basis of αi.  
Our finding that the functional activity of LC is associated with the average LR of 
each epoch (αi) and that αi is adapted to the local volatility of the mean and noise level 
provides the first direct empirical evidence for a link between the functional 
involvement of LC and the adaptive LR. Such findings provide solid support for the 
crucial role of LC in the regulation of optimal learning under uncertainty (Yu & 
Dayan 2003; Aston-Jones & J. D. Cohen 2005). LC has been considered as part of the 
ascending reticular activating system and acknowledged for the role in regulating the 
overall alertness and nonspecific arousal (Moruzzi & Magoun 1949; Steriade 1996). 
Animal studies show that LC neurons fire robustly to novel stimuli during free 
exploration and conditioning experiments (e.g. Vankov et al. 1995). Such responses 
of LC disappear when there is no prediction value of the stimuli and reappear as soon 
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as the stimulus reinforcement contingencies change (Sara et al, 1994; Sara & Segal, 
1991). Importantly, LC responses to the changes in stimulus-reinforcement 
contingencies precede the changes in behavioral responses in both rats and monkeys 
(Sara et al. 1994; Sara & Segal 1991; Aston-Jones et al. 1997). These existing 
findings suggest the strong association between the functional activity of LC and 
learning behavior, whereas few studies have demonstrated such associations in 
humans. Our findings fill this gap and further link the functional activity of LC with 
the computationally complex function of adaptively weighting new information based 
on the local contexts. 
In addition to LC, the functional activity of the left INS and preSMA are also 
positively associated with the average LR of each epoch  (αi). As the Insula has been 
reported to have an important role in risk processing (Preuschoff et al. 2008), the 
involvement of the insula in our task may be related to the tracking of noise levels and 
the adjustment of the LR accordingly. The activation of the preSMA has been 
associated with voluntary movements, action-based sequential learning, error 
processing and facilitation of decision-making under time pressure (van Gaal et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2010; Zentgraf et al. 2005; Kennerley et al. 2004; Inase et al. 1996; 
Forstmann et al. 2008). The activation in preSMA in our task may be related to 
transforming the LR signals into action.  
We find that the transient component of LR (βt) is associated with a different set of 
regions: the ACC and RIFG, two core regions in the monitoring system that have 
been documented to engage in swift cognitive control and working memory (e.g. 
Aron et al. 2004; Chikazoe et al. 2007; Krawczyk 2002; Botvinick et al. 2004; 
Holroyd et al. 2004; Achtziger et al. 2012). Additionally, the co-activation of the 
ACC and RIFG has been shown to be associated with the performance accuracy after 
a change of the reward contingency in reversal learning (Ghahremani et al. 2010).  
The LR encoding may reflect a diverse range of processes involved in linking 
multiple sources of information and selective retrieval of information from memory, 
which may be supported by anatomically distributed brain networks that share 
information in a dynamic manner. Our findings here suggest that there may be two 
parallel systems supporting the adaptive adjustment of the LR. The first system, 
including LC, INS and preSMA, is mainly involved in tracking the average features 
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of a recent history and adapt the LR accordingly; whereas the second system, 
including ACC and RIFG, complement the first system by providing more precise and 
swift adjustment based on local information at each time point. Some existing 
evidence supports this speculation. For example, it has been found that ACC and LC 
closely interact with each other in learning under uncertainty (e.g. Yu & Dayan, 
2005).  
In summary, we find that participants’ LRs vary according to local statistical features: 
(i) The LR is lower in contexts with a higher noise level, and (ii) The LR is higher in 
contexts with a changing mean and a stable noise level (a relevant change) compared 
to contexts with a stable mean and a changing noise level (an irrelevant change). 
Furthermore, we find that the adaptive LR is positively correlated with the functional 
activity of a region in the pons, consistent with the position of locus coeruleus (LC), 
at the individual level, providing the first direct empirical evidence for the link 
between functional activity of LC and the computationally complex function of 
adaptively weighting new information based on the local contexts. Moreover, our 
finding also suggest there might be another parallel system, consists of of the ACC 
and RIFG, which is involved in providing a more swift and precise trial-based 
adjustment for the LR encoding.  
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Supplementary materials 
Method for generating the task sequence  
A sequence of observations was generated from the underlying Gaussian distributions 
N (û, σ) before the experiment. All observations were restricted to be within 0 to 100. 
The underlying mean (û) and standard deviation (σ) were generated as following. In 
the stable session, û was randomly initialized and remained constant over the session. 
In the volatile session, û was randomly generated (0 to 100) and remained constant for 
a short period (block length was drawn from N (19, 3)) before a change occurred. The 
change amplitude was drawn from a Uniform distribution (U (15, 20)) and could be 
either positive or negative with equal probabilities. In both the stable and volatile 
sessions, σ changed multiple times. The block length for each σ was drawn from a 
Gaussian distribution (N (10, 2)). The initial σ of a session could either be low (σ = 4) 
or high (σ = 10). The change amplitude of σ was drawn from a Uniform distribution 
(U (6, 7.8)). In order to prevent subjects noticing obvious change points of the 
distribution, we imposed restrictions on the new distribution by calculating the 
likelihood of a new observation coming from either distribution. We used these to 
make sure that the likelihood of coming from the new distribution was higher but not 
twice as high as that of the old distribution.  
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Figure S1. An example of the session with stable mean. The solid blue line 
represents the underlying mean, which remained unknown to subjects and had to be 
inferred. Black dashed lines illustrate the standard deviation (SD), which changed 
independently of the mean. Green line represents the samples drawn from the 
underlying distributions. Red dots were the guesses of a subject. Notably, the mean 
and SD could suddenly change but subjects could only infer that from the received 
observations. 
 
 
Instruction procedure 
We explained the task to our subjects in the following steps. First, we provided some 
real-life examples where one has to estimate the true value based on noisy 
observations. Subjects were instructed about the current task and explicitly told that 
over a session the true value could either keep stable or change multiple times, while 
the noise level could also change multiple times, but independent of the change of the 
true value. Subjects were also aware that the observations and the mean are 
determined at the beginning of each block and do not depend on their previous 
guesses. Second, subjects watched two demo sessions (one with stable true mean and 
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the other with volatile mean), with the true value and corresponding observations 
shown. The demo sessions had identical structures as the main sessions but with only 
20 trials.  Third, subjects had two sessions (one with stable true mean and the other 
with volatile mean) of practice outside the scanner and immediately followed by a 
replay of these sessions where they could observe their own responses together with 
the underlying mean. Subjects practiced how to make responses in the scanner before 
the scanning session started.  
Payment mechanism 
At the end of the experiment, only one session was randomly chosen and the 
performance score of this session decided the payment, i.e. payment was 
monotonically decreasing with the average error of this randomly chosen session. 
Detailed information was provided to subjects in Table S1.  
Table S1: Payment table of our task.   
Average Error Total Payment 
 (CHF) 
Average Error Total Payment 
 (CHF) 
0 120 6 75 
1 100 7 70 
2 95 8 65 
3 90 9 60 
4 85 ≥ 10 55 
5 80   
 
Our payment mechanism provided incentives for subjects to report their best guesses 
for each trial. In order to maximize the payment, subjects needed to minimize the 
average distance between their estimations of the mean at trial t (ût) and µt across the 
session, i.e. E(|ût– µt|). The underlying sequence was determined before the 
experiment and did not depend on subjects’ responses. Consequently, subjects should 
minimize |ût– µt| in each trial, i.e. report their best estimation for µt.  
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Subjects 
One subject was excluded from the final analysis because of difficulty in 
understanding the task reported in the post-experiment interview. Also this subject 
reported falling asleep during the experiment in the scanner.  
Behavioral data analysis procedure 
Below we provide the detailed procedure of our analysis through an example subject. 
First, we divided each session into epochs based on changes in the underlying 
distribution (either the mean or the noise level). Trials between changes were 
considered as belonging to an epoch. The length of epochs (mean ± s. d.) is 8.14 ± 
3.69 (trials). An example is provided in Figure S1. 
 
 
Figure S2. Data of an example session. Here we divided the whole session into 
different epochs based on changes in the underlying distribution. The time points 
where the change occurred are illustrated as black dashed vertical lines, and trials 
between two dashed lines constituted an epoch.  
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Second, we estimated the average LR for epoch i (αi) based on Rescorla-Wagner rule 
through linear least squares regression. For example, in the example session we 
illustrated in Figure S1, there were eight epochs (n = 8). Therefore formula (1) 
became: 
ût+1 – ût  = 𝛼!   ×  𝑏!"×  𝛿!!!!!  + et        (4) 
and,  
et = βt  × δt             (5) 
We illustrate the estimated αi, βt, et in Figure S3 a, b, c, respectively. In addition, in 
order to evaluate how well subjects’ guesses can be explained by our assumption of 
the constant LR for each epoch, we calculated the predicted guesses based on αi, 
namely: 
Predicted-guessest+1 = 𝛼!   ×  𝑏!"×  𝛿!!!!!  + ût       (6) 
We illustrate the predicted guesses together with the original subject’s guesses of an 
example session in Figure S3d. In addition, we provide a scatter plot of the predicted 
guesses against subjects’ guesses from all sessions across subjects in Figure S4. From 
both figures we can see that the constant LR for epoch i (αi) can give a good 
explanation of subjects’ actual guesses.  
 
  
 
	   84	  
a.       b. 
 
c.       d. 
 
Figure S3. a. Estimated alpha of an example session. b. Estimated beta of an example 
session. c. et (residuals from regression) of an example session. d. Predicted guesses 
based on our estimated alpha following formula (6) of an example session. Here we 
can see that the constant LR for each epoch can give a good explanation of subjects’ 
actual guesses.  
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Figure S4. Scatter plot between subjects’ guesses and the predicted guesses based 
on alpha. The result suggests that the assumption of a constant LR for each epoch 
gives a good explanation of subjects’ guesses. 
 
 
Third, we classified epochs into different types based on the volatility of the mean and 
noise level, as described in the Methods section.  
Behavior results 
The average distance over subjects (mean ± s.d.) was 3.62 ± 0.97. The average 
reaction time across subjects (mean ± s.d.) was 5.06 ± 0.89 s. 
fMRI results 
 
Figure S5. The position of our activation in LC. Similar to Keren et.al (2009), we 
display the activation in LC in multiple slices. The activation here in the pons matches 
the reported position of LC in Keren et.al (2009).  
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Table S2: Significant whole-brain clusters that were positively correlated with α (a) 
and β (b) at the observation stage. Data were first reported at a threshold of p < 0.001, 
cluster level FWE corrected and small volume FWE corrected for our hypothesized 
region LC (shown in bold). We also reported clusters significant at a sub-threshold of 
p < 0.001 and cluster level uncorrected p < 0.05. Local maxima within these clusters 
are reported together with the number of voxels (cluster size); Hemisphere (HEM); 
Left (L); Right (R); Brodmann area (BA); x, y, z are MNI coordinates of the local 
maximum. 
a. Neural correlates of α at the observation stage 
HEM Region name BA 
X 
(mm) 
Y 
(mm) 
Z 
(mm) t value 
Cluster 
pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
Size 
L Insula 48 -44 16 0 5.68 0.048 0.002 68 
L 
Supplementary 
motor  6 -6 10 52 5.19 0.025 0.001 79 
L 
Locus 
Coeruleus 
 
-6 -30 -24 4.33 0.659 0.038 25 
R Thalamus 
 
2 -20 6 5.07 0.723 0.046 23 
 
b. Neural correlates of β at the observation stage 
HEM Region name BA 
X 
(mm) 
Y 
(mm) 
Z 
(mm) t value 
Cluster 
pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
R 
Inferior 
Frontal cortex  45 56 24 6 4.59 0.042 0.002 81 
R 
Anterior 
Cingulate 32 4 44 22 4.48 0.14 0.006 58 
R 
Superior Medial 
Frontal cortex 32 6 32 40 4.62 0.313 0.016 43 
R Insula 48 34 14 -10 5 0.678 0.048 27 
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Table S3. Significant whole-brain clusters that were positively correlated with α (a) 
and β (b) at the guess stage. Data were first reported at a threshold of p < 0.001, 
cluster level FWE corrected (shown in bold). We also reported clusters significant at a 
sub-threshold of p < 0.001 and cluster level uncorrected p < 0.05. Local maxima 
within these clusters are reported together with the number of voxels (cluster size). 
a. Neural correlates of α at the guess stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
t value Cluster pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
Inferior Parietal -42 -48 48 5.16 0.18 0.008 50 
SupraMarginal -58 -30 38 5.08 0.13 0.006 55 
 
b. Neural correlates of β at the guess stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
t value Cluster pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
Precuneus 10 -66 50 5.23 0.007 0.000 109 
SupraMarginal -58 -30 38 4.73 0.64 0.04 27 
 
c. Neural correlates of guessed number at the confirmation stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
t value Cluster pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
Lingual 22 -72 4 3.87 0.463 0.026 35 
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Table S4. Functional activations at the guessing, confirmation and new observation 
stage of a trial. Significant results were shown at an uncorrected threshold of p<0.001, 
FWE corrected at the cluster level.  
a. Functional activations at the observation stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates      
(x y z) 
t value Cluster pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
Peak 
p(FWE
-cor) 
Calcarine_R 16 -86   4 11.82 < 0.001 < 0.001 15530 < 0.001 
Frontal_Mid_R 28 14 50 8.97 < 0.001 < 0.001 2094 0.003 
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L -52 26 30 8.97 < 0.001 < 0.001 703 0.003 
Precentral_L -30   6 48 8.32 < 0.001 < 0.001 279 0.01 
Insula_R 34 14 -14 7.01 < 0.001 < 0.001 353 0.078 
Paracentral_L -6 -30 58 6.79 < 0.001 < 0.001 464 0.107 
Insula_L -32 20  -6 6.33 0.041 0.003 114 0.205 
Temporal_Mid_L -56 -48 14 5.3 0.013 0.001 148 0.685 
Frontal_Sup_R 26 54   8 5.22 0.02 0.001 136 0.732 
 
b. Functional activations at the guess stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
t 
value 
Cluster 
pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
peak 
p(FWE
-cor) 
Parietal_Inf_L -26 -50 46 13.02 < 0.001 < 0.001 13549 < 0.001 
Fusiform_R 32 -50 -14 9.88 < 0.001 < 0.001 732 0.001 
Precentral_L -56   6 24 8.58 < 0.001 < 0.001 386 0.007 
Precentral_R 28  -4 58 7.95 < 0.001 < 0.001 649 0.02 
Cerebelum_4_5_L -4 -30  -8 7.12 0.011 0.001 133 0.078 
Frontal_Inf_Oper_R 58   8 24 6.56 < 0.001 < 0.001 259 0.174 
Cingulum_Mid_L -12 -22 42 6.33 0.036 0.002 103 0.238 
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c. Functional activations at the confirmation stage 
Region name 
MNI 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
t value Cluster pFWE 
Cluster 
uncorr 
Cluster 
size 
peak 
p(FWE
-cor) 
Cerebelum_4_5_R 10 -56 -20 14.97 < 0.001 < 0.001 60835 < 0.001 
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L -46 42 14 5.09 < 0.001 < 0.001 351 0.745 
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Experiment Instruction 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment!   
Wir leben in einer ungenauen Welt, in der wir Zahlenwerte auf Basis einer Reihe 
unvollkommener Beobachtungen abschätzen müssen. Z.B.  -­‐ indem wir jeden Tag die Temperatur beobachten, können wir für verschiedene 
Jahreszeiten in einer Gegend Durchschnittstemperaturen schätzen;  -­‐ indem wir den täglichen Preis einer Aktie beobachten, können wir mit der Zeit 
den wahren Wert dieser Aktie abschätzen;  -­‐ indem wir verschiedene Wege von Zürich nach Bern abfahren, können wir 
den wahren Abstand zwischen den beiden Städten und die mittlere Fahrzeit 
abschätzen.  
In allen drei Beispielen müssen wir den wahren Wert aus fehlerbehafteten 
Beobachtungen schätzen. Manchmal bleibt der korrekte Wert über die Zeit hin 
konstant, wie etwa die Distanz zwischen Zürich und Bern, manchmal ändert er sich 
jedoch, wie etwa der Wert einer Aktie auf dem Finanzmarkt. 
Die Beobachtungen können mehr oder weniger genau sein: -­‐ Bitten wir z.B. 10 Personen die heutige Temperatur mit Hilfe eines 
Thermometers zu bestimmen, so werden die Beobachtungen sehr eng 
beieinander liegen.  -­‐ Bitten wir hingegen die gleichen 10 Personen, die Temperatur ohne Hilfe 
eines Thermometers zu bestimmen, so werden die Beobachtungen weit 
auseinander liegen.  
Im heutigen Experiment ist es Ihre Aufgabe, den wahren Wert mit Hilfe 
fehlerhafter Beobachtungen zu bestimmen. Ihre Auszahlung wird durch die 
Genauigkeit Ihrer Schätzung beeinflusst.  
 
Der heutige Ablauf ist wie folgt: -­‐ Demo (ausserhalb des Scanners) -­‐ Probedurchläufe (ausserhalb des Scanners) -­‐ Experiment (im Scanner) -­‐ Post-scanning session (ausserhalb des Scanners; post-rating, Fragebogen) -­‐ Auszahlung 
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Demo  
In der Demo auf dem Computer vor Ihnen können Sie sehen wie fehlerhafte 
Beobachtungen und wahrer Wert zusammenhängen können. Sie sehen nacheinander 
fehlerbehaftete Beobachtungen (gelb) und den wahren Wert (rot). Der wahre Wert 
und die Beobachtungen werden entlang einer horizontalen Linie von 0 bis 100 
dargestellt (siehe Abbildung). Sie können sich die gelben Ziffern z.B. als Schätzungen 
der Wassertemperatur oder schwankende Aktienpreise vorstellen. Die rote Ziffer wäre 
dann die wahre Wassertemperatur oder der wahre Aktienwert. 
 
 
WICHTIG: Während des Experiments werden Sie nur die gelben 
Beobachtungen sehen. Ihre Aufgabe wird es sein, den roten Wert mit Hilfe 
dieser Beobachtungen zu schätzen.  
Um die Demo zu starten, drücken Sie 's'. Schauen Sie der Demo aufmerksam zu und 
beantworten Sie dann die folgenden 2 Fragen bevor Sie auf der nächsten Seite 
fortfahren. Wenn Sie Fragen zur Demo haben oder eine weitere Demo sehen 
möchten, melden Sie sich bitte beim Versuchsleiter. 
 
Fragen zur Demo: 
1) Hat sich der wahre Wert während der Demo geändert? 
A. Ja 
B. Nein   
2) Hat sich während der Demo die Genauigkeit des Beobachtungswerts verändert 
(d. h. der durchschnittliche Abstand zwischen den gelben und roten Zahlen)? 
A. Ja 
B. Nein 
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Probedurchlauf & Experiment 
Während des Probedurchlaufs und Experiments, werden Sie wiederum verschiedene 
Beobachtungen zwischen 0 und 100 sehen. Nach jeder Beobachtung geben Sie Ihre 
derzeitige Schätzung des wahren Wertes ein. Beachten Sie, dass Sie den wahren 
Wert (rote Zahl in der Demo) nie sehen werden, sondern nur die 
fehlerbehafteten Beobachtungen (gelbe Zahlen). In jedem Durchlauf kann sich 
der wahre Wert gelegentlich ändern (aber auf keinen Fall nach jeder Runde). Sie 
sollten den wahren Wert so akkurat wie möglich schätzen.  Am Ende jedes 
Durchlaufs errechnet der Computer Ihren durchschnittlichen Fehler für diesen 
Durchlauf.  
Der Ablauf des Experiments ist wie folgt: 
1. Zu Beginn der ersten Runde, sehen Sie eine grüne zufällige Zahl, die Ihre 
nächste Schätzung repräsentiert.  
2. Wenn Sie den blauen Knopf drücken (Zeigefinger), verringern Sie die Zahl. 
Wenn Sie den gelben Knopf drücken (Mittelfinger), vergrössern Sie die Zahl.  
3. Um Ihre Schätzung zu bestätigen, drücken Sie den grünen Knopf 
(Ringfinger). Ihr Schätzwert erscheint jetzt in weiss. Sie haben zehn 
Sekunden Zeit, um Ihre Wahl zu treffen. Danach wird die momentane 
Position der grünen Zahl automatisch als Ihre Wahl betrachtet  
4. Die Runde endet mit einem neuen Beobachtungswert (gelb). Ausgehend von 
diesem Beobachtungswert können Sie ihre soeben getroffene Entscheidung 
überdenken und einen neuen Schätzwert abgeben. Im untenstehenden Beispiel 
war "65" die Schätzung der Versuchsperson und "55" ist der neue 
Beobachtungswert. 
 
5. Die nächste Runde beginnt. Der Schätzwert aus der vorangegangenen Runde 
wird grau dargestellt, der neue Beobachtungswert gelb und die neue 
Zufallszahl grün. Im untenstehenden Beispiel war "65" die Schätzung der 
Versuchsperson, der letzte Beobachtungswert "55" und die momentane 
Zufallszahl "22". Danach geht es wie oben (Punkt 2.) weiter.  
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Sie werden das Experiment zunächst ausserhalb des Scanners üben. Ihre Schätzungen 
während dieses Probedurchlaufes werden Ihre Auszahlung nicht beeinflussen.  
Im Anschluss spielen Sie 4 Durchläufe mit jeweils 60 Beobachtungen (Runden) im 
Scanner. Ihre Schätzungen während dieses Durchläufe werden Ihre Auszahlung 
beeinflussen. . 
Auszahlung: 
Die Gesamtsumme, die Ihnen ausgezahlt wird, hängt vom Durchschnittsfehler ab, um 
den Ihre Schätzungen von der korrekten Zahl abweichen (in der Demo rot angegeben 
und nicht mit den gelben Beobachtungswerten zu verwechseln!).  
Nach dem Experiment werden Sie zufällig einen der vier Durchläufe auswählen. Das 
Ergebnis des Blocks wird wie folgt zur Vergütung Ihres Erscheinens (30 CHF) 
addiert: Wenn der Durchschnittsfehler des ausgewählten Blocks 1 ist, werden Sie 
zusätzlich 70 CHF erhalten (gesamt: 70+30=100). Wenn der Durchschnittsfehler bei 
2 liegt, werden Sie 65 CHF erhalten, liegt der Fehler bei 3, erhalten Sie CHF 60 usw. 
(siehe Tabelle für Gesamtauszahlung). 
Durchschnittsfehler Gesamt-
Auszahlung 
(CHF) 
Durchschnittsfehler Gesamt-
Auszahlung 
(CHF) 
0 120 6 75 
1 100 7 70 
2 95 8 65 
3 90 9 60 
4 85 ≥ 10 55 
5 80   
 
Beachten Sie bitte, dass  -­‐ es nicht die Differenz zwischen Ihrer Schätzung und der nächsten 
Beobachtung ist die zählt, sondern die Differenz zwischen Ihrer 
Schätzung und dem wahren Wert.  
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-­‐ der wahre Wert und die Beobachtungen zu Beginn des Durchlaufs 
bestimmt werden und nicht durch Ihre bisherigen Schätzungen 
beeinflusst werden. -­‐ jede Runde zählt und zu Ihrer Endauszahlung beiträgt. Entscheiden Sie 
daher sorgfältig und so genau und schnell wie möglich. 
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Probedurchlauf:  
Wir beginnen mit den Probedurchläufen (30 Beobachtungen pro Durchlauf), damit 
Sie ein Gespür für die Aufgabe und das Schätzen bekommen. Um den Probedurchlauf 
zu starten, drücken Sie ‘s’. Drücken Sie die rechte Pfeiltaste, um die Zahl nach rechts 
zu bewegen, und die linke Pfeiltaste, um die Zahl nach links zu bewegen, sowie die 
nach oben Pfeiltaste, um Ihre Schätzung zu bestätigen. 
Nach der Übung werden wir Ihnen den Durchlauf vorspielen. Ihre Schätzungen, die 
Beobachtungswerte, die sie gesehen haben, und der korrekte Wert werden Ihnen 
nacheinander für jede Runde des Probedurchlaufes gezeigt.: 
1. Der korrekte Wert (rot) und Ihr Schätzwert für die aktuelle Runde (weiß) 
werden dargestellt: 
 
2. Der Beobachtungswert wird gelb dargestellt, Ihr Schätzwert weiß und der 
korrekte Wert rot: 
 
Bitte benachrichtigen Sie den Versuchsleiter, wenn Sie weiter üben möchten.  
.   
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Bevor das Experiment beginnt, bitten wir Sie, folgende Fragen zu beantworten: 
1) Verändert sich der korrekte Wert in jeder Runde? 
A. Ja 
B. Nein   
2) Verändert sich die Genauigkeit der Beobachtungen in jeder Runde? 
A. Ja 
B. Nein   
3) Können Sie den korrekten Wert während des Experiments sehen? 
A. Ja 
B. Nein 
4) Was sollen Sie während des Experiments abschätzen? 
A. den fehlerbehafteten Beobachtungswert. 
B. den vorangegangenen Beobachtungswert. 
C. den korrekten Wert. 
 
Sie können nun mit dem eigentlichen Experiment beginnen. Wir wünschen 
Ihnen dabei viel Spaß und viel Glück bei den Schätzungen! 
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Experiment protocol 
 
1. Pre-scanning practice. 
1) The experimenter gives the consent form (ask English or German), ethic 
form, and fMRI potential risk checking-list to the subject. 
2) Subjects read instruction, watch the experiment demo and complete a 
practice session. We check whether subjects have understood the task and 
answered the control questions correctly. Note: we display the same demo 
for a second time if the subject doesn’t fully understand the task and would 
like to watch the demo again. To keep the consistency between subjects, 
we used the same learning sequence in the demo for every subject. 
 
2. The subject enters the scanner room and is instructed about the response 
buttons.  
 
3. The subject has a practice session in the scanner to get familiarized with the 
response buttons. 
 
4. The subject completes all four functional scanning sessions. 
 
5. The experimenter gives the payment to the subject according to his/her 
performance in the randomly chosen session. 
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Appendix  
C. Structural and Functional Neural Correlates of 
Individual Learning Ability 
 
This chapter is joint work with Ernst Fehr, Kerstin Preuschoff and Yosuke Morishima
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Structural and Functional Neural Correlates of Individual Learning 
Ability 
Chaohui Guo, Yosuke Morishima, Kerstin Preuschoff *, Ernst Fehr * 
 
Abstract 
 
Individuals differ in the ability of learning the state of the world and hidden reward 
contingencies, particularly when the situation involves a high degree of uncertainty. 
However, it still remains unclear what the neuroanatomical determinants underlying 
such heterogeneity are. Here we measure individual learning ability by comparing the 
learning performance of each individual with that of a Bayesian updating model. We 
find that there is a large variety in the learning performance across subjects and such 
individual differences are associated with both the grey matter (GM) volume and the 
functional involvement of the cerebellum and a brain area covering the right 
postcentral gyrus, Inferior Parietal cortex and Supramarginal gyrus. These results 
provide congruent structural and functional evidence for the importance of these 
regions in the information integration process and suggest a link between the lower-
order sensorimotor learning and the belief updating in higher-order learning under 
uncertainty. 
 
Key words: learning; computational modelling; VBM; cerebellum; changing 
environment; 
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Introduction 
 
Individuals differ in their abilities to learn the state of the world and hidden reward 
contingencies based on noisy observations, particularly when the situation involves a 
high degree of uncertainty. A previous study shows that the degree of the functional 
representation of reinforcement learning signals in the striatum differs between 
learner and non-learners in a reward-learning task (Schonberg et al. 2007). However, 
it still remains unclear what the neuroanatomical determinants underlie these 
behavioral and functional inter-individual differences are. In this study, we aim to 
identify the brain regions whose structural properties and functional involvement are 
associated with inter-individual differences in the learning ability in a changing 
environment. Based on the existing findings that higher gray matter (GM) volume 
accompanies better cognitive ability (de Lange et al. 2008; Hogan et al. 2011; Kanai 
& Rees 2011), we hypothesized that better learning performance would accompany 
higher GM volume and higher functional involvement during learning of some brain 
regions, and these brain regions may be the ones involved in higher-order cognition 
such as the prefrontal cortex or in lower-order sensorimotor learning such as the 
cerebellum, which we explain in details in the following. 
Our first hypothesis that individual learning performance is associated with the 
structural and functional properties of the prefrontal cortex is based on the massive 
findings on the functional importance of the prefrontal cortex in cognition, working 
memory, memory retrieval, executive control and other functions important for 
higher-order decision-making (e.g. Wagner et al. 2001; Hampton et al. 2006; Coricelli 
& Nagel 2009; Barraclough et al. 2004; Boes et al. 2009; Morgan 1999; Badre & 
Wagner 2007; Petrides 2005; Krawczyk 2002; de Lange et al. 2008). Moreover, the 
GM volume of regions in the prefrontal cortex has been reported to be associated with 
inter-individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g. Schonberg et al. 2007; Matsuo 
et al. 2009; Ceccarelli et al. 2009; Frangou et al. 2004; Narr et al. 2007; de Lange et 
al. 2008). 
Our second hypothesis is that individual differences in the learning performance will 
be associated with the structural and functional properties of the cerebellum. The 
cerebellum, one of the oldest brain regions in humans and animals, has been 
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considered as the efficient neuronal system for fast online state estimation based on 
noisy sensory inputs (Wagner et al. 2001; Miall et al. 2007; Hampton et al. 2006; 
Paulin 2005; Coricelli & Nagel 2009; Bastian 2006; Barraclough et al. 2004; Boes et 
al. 2009; Morgan 1999; Badre & Wagner 2007; Petrides 2005; Krawczyk 2002; de 
Lange et al. 2008). The cerebellum has been proposed to serve a general function of 
learning to predict and prepare for imminent information acquisition, analysis, or 
action (Raymond et al. 1996). Moreover, its functional role has been extended to 
higher cognitive functions, such as probabilistic reasoning (Passot et al. 2013), 
working memory (Chen et al. 2012), error processing (Ide & Li 2011), prediction of 
future events (Bastian 2006) and other crucial functions for successful learning under 
uncertainty (Blackwood et al. 2004). There has been increasing evidence that links the 
cerebellum with learning behaviors. For example, patients with lesion in the 
cerebellum show significant impairments in the reward-based reversal learning and 
sequence learning (Dirnberger et al. 2013; Thoma et al. 2008).  
In order to test our hypotheses, we measure individual learning ability in a changing 
environment by comparing the learning performance of each individual with that of 
an Ideal Learner model (ILM), which integrates new observations following Bayesian 
updating rules, in a mean-guessing task (Guo et al. in preparation). We used Particle 
filter (PF), one of Bayesian inference methods, to estimate the hidden variables in 
ILM. PF is a Markov chain-Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach to recursive dynamical 
state estimation and has been widely applied in neuroscience studies to investigate the 
neural organizations of the brain, such as the sensorimotor information updating 
process in the cerebellum (Paulin 2005), the representation of action value in the 
striatum (Samejima et al. 2005), and the perceptual inference on cortical hierarchies 
(Lee & Mumford 2003). We choose PF as our Bayesian inference method because the 
principles of this method are remarkably compatible with those of the neural systems 
in the brain, and PF requires no assumptions about the form of the posterior 
distributions of variables.  
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Methods 
 
Subjects 
Twenty healthy subjects (10 female; 19-27 years old) with no history of neurological 
or psychiatric illness participated in our task. The study was approved by the ethical 
committee of Canton Zurich. Written informed consents were obtained from all 
participants. 
Task 
We employed the dataset from a previous study (Guo et.al, In preparation). In this 
dataset, we adopted a mean-guessing task to investigate human learning behavior in a 
changing environment. Below we provide some basic information about the task, and 
see more details in the Methods part of Guo et al (in preparation).  
In this task, we generated random numbers from a hidden Gaussian distribution (N (û, 
σ )) where its mean (û) and standard deviation (σ) can change unexpectedly. Subjects 
were presented with one observation on each trial and were asked to report their trial-
by-trial estimations of the underlying mean (û) based on observations. All 
observations and the underlying mean were ranged within 0 to 100. Each subject 
completed four sessions of 60 trials in each session. Presenting orders of the four 
sessions were randomized across subjects. The four sessions differed in the volatility 
of the mean: two sessions were with stable mean over the session (Figure S1), and the 
other two sessions were with volatile mean (Figure 1). Subjects were informed that 
the mean and the observations were within 0 to 100, and the mean and the noise level 
could both change, but independently of each other, for multiple times over each 
session. Notably, subjects were not informed of the type of the block. 
Absolute error for each trial was calculated as the absolute distant between the 
guessed number and the true underlying mean. At the end of each session, a score was 
calculated by averaging the trial-by-trial absolute error from the second to the last trial 
and was presented to subjects. At the end of the experiment, only one session was 
randomly chosen and the score of this session decided the payment, i.e. payment was 
scaled inversely with the score of this randomly chosen session.  
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Behavioral analysis 
We examined the inter-individual differences in the ability of learning the mean of 
underlying distributions in the following two steps. First, we provided the trial-by-
trial optimal estimates of the underlying mean based on an Ideal Learner model (ILM), 
which integrates new information through Bayesian updating. Second, we compared 
each individual’s learning performance with that of the ILM under the same learning 
sequences (including underlying distributions and observations). 
For the first step, we adopted the same estimation procedure as in Samejima et al, 
2005.  In our ILM model, hidden variables are x (i) = {Bt, αt} and the observable 
variable is y (i) = {St}, where Bt is the estimation of the underlying mean, αt is the 
learning rate, and St is the observation at time t. We used 20,000 particles to 
approximate the distributions of the hidden variables, and set the initial prior particles 
for B0 to be beta distributed within 0 to 100 while shape parameters both equal two 
(i.e. 100 × beta (2,2); the distribution range of 0 to 100 is due to the fact that the mean 
and observations are within this range) and for α0 to be beta distributed (beta (0.5,0.5)) 
within 0 to 1 (the standard range assumed by classical reinforcement learning models). 
Beta distribution was chosen because it allows us to restrict variables within a certain 
range.  
The conditional probability of the hidden variables P (x (i)| y (i), i = 1, … , t-1) is 
updated recursively following the Rescorla-Wagner rule:  
Bt+1 = Bt + αt ×(St - Bt) + εt         (1) 
where εt follows Gaussian distribution N (0, 2). As so far there is no conclusion about 
the update algorithm for αt in a changing environment, we took αt as flat distributed 
within 0 to 1 (beta (0.5,0.5), the same as the prior distribution) for every time point. 
Notably, Bt and αt were always restricted within the range of [0,100] and [0,1], 
respectively, over the recursive estimation process. 
As the samples were generated from the underlying Gaussian distribution, the 
measurement equation (the relationship between the observation and hidden variables) 
is: St ~ N (Bt, σt). Here σt was calculated as the standard deviation of the distribution 
of Bt. Importantly, to make sure that the estimates from IML were not dependent on 
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our settings of priors, we compared the estimated results from ILM with different 
settings of priors (details in supplementary materials).    
In the second step, we first calculated the trial-by-trial absolute distance of subjects’ 
guesses to the estimates of ILM. Next we calculated the learning performance of each 
session by averaging the trial-by-trial absolute distance from the second to the last 
trial of the session. Finally, an index (labeled as guess2est) for each individual’s 
learning performance was calculated by averaging the performance across sessions. 
Notably, as guess2est measures the distance to the performance of ILM, a smaller 
number of guess2est stands for better learning performance.  
Additionally, we calculated the average distance of subjects’ guesses to the 
underlying mean over sessions (labeled as guess2mu). The learning sequences for 
subjects were randomly determined and were different across subjects, which may 
result in differences in the learning difficulty of sequences. Therefore, guess2mu is a 
coarse measurement of individual’s learning performance, as it might be confounded 
by the difficulty of the learning sequences. We calculate this variable to provide a 
second dimension for evaluating subjects’ learning behaviours, whereas we don’t use 
it to identify the neural correlates for individual learning ability. 
 
Image Acquisition and MRI Data Analysis 
Data were acquired with a 3T Philips Achieva scanner. High-resolution structural T1-
weighted 3D-TFE anatomical scans of the whole brain (voxel size 1.1×1.1×0.6 mm, 
TR = 7.5 ms, TE = 3.5 ms, flip angle = 8°) were acquired for each participant right 
before they started the behavioral sessions. Data were analyzed in SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) according to the standard procedure in the Voxel-
based Morphology (VBM) tutorial (Ashburner 2010). First, T1 images for each 
subject was segmented in the native space into six classes of tissue: gray matter (GM), 
white matter (WM), Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), skull, soft tissue outside the brain, and 
other signals outside the head. Second, the deformations that best align the images 
together were estimated by iteratively registering the imported images (the GM and 
WM images generated from the first step) with their average in DARTEL (Ashburner 
2007). Third, the DARTEL template from the previous step was registered to the 
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Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space through affine transformation. The 
estimated parameters and DARTEL flow-fields were used to generate spatially 
normalized GM images. The normalized GM images were then spatially smoothed 
using a Gaussian kernel of 6mm full width at half-maximum (FWHM).  
Individual GM images were taken into multiple regression models to identify the 
brain structures whose gray matter density were associated with inter-individual 
differences in learning ability in a changing environment. We included guess2est 
(mean-centered) in the regression model for each subject as a covariate to identify the 
brain regions that are positively correlated with the inter-individual differences in 
learning ability. In addition, we included total brain gray matter volume as a covariate 
to adjust for individual differences in brain size. Age and gender were also included 
as covariates (without centering) to control for the potential confounding effects. We 
included an explicit mask (created by applying a 0.2 absolute threshold masking on 
the averaged GM images of all subjects) to restrict the reasonable searching area. 
Significant results were reported (unless explicitly specified) at the threshold of 
p<0.001 at the voxel level, FWE corrected at the cluster level p<0.05, with the non-
stationary cluster correction (details in the supplementary). 
 
Results 
Behavior results 
We first illustrate subjects’ guesses together with the underlying distributions to 
examine whether subjects are able to track the underlying mean (Figure 1 for a 
representative example). We observe that, on the whole, subjects are able to track the 
underlying mean. When the mean changes, subjects detect the change with a delay of 
several trials and adjust their guesses accordingly (Figure 1). Average distance of 
guesses to the underlying mean across subjects, guess2mu, (mean ± SD) was 3.9 ± 1.2.  
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Figure 1. An example session and data. The solid blue line represents the underlying 
mean, which remains unknown to subjects and has to be guessed. Black dashed lines 
illustrate the standard deviation (SD), which changes independently of the mean. 
Green line represents the samples drawn from underlying distributions. Red dots are 
the guesses from a representative subject. The mean and noise level can suddenly 
change without informing subjects, which they can only infer based on the received 
observations. 
 
 
Estimations from ILM 
We illustrate the trial-by-trial estimation of the underlying mean from ILM. See 
Figure 2 for a representative example. The average departure of the estimations of 
ILM from the underlying mean across sessions (mean ± SD) is: 3.6 ± 0.6. Further test 
shows that ILM performed slightly better compared to participants (one-sided, paired 
t-test, t (19) = 1.9, p < 0.05). The difference of learning performance between subjects 
and ILM, guess2est (mean ± SD) is: 0.4 ± 0.9. Notably, the estimations from the ILM 
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are not influenced by the prior settings, suggesting that these effects are robust to the 
use of different model parameters (details in the supplementary materials).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of estimated results from the ILM. The solid line represents 
the mean of the underlying sequence. The line with filled dot illustrates the 
estimations of the underlying mean from the ILM. Dashed line represents guesses 
from the subject. From the figure we can observe that on the whole the ILM and 
subjects are both able to track the underlying mean, while the ILM detects the 
underlying change and adapts to the change faster. 
 
 
Structural correlates of the individual differences in learning performance  
To identify the structural correlates of the inter-individual differences in the learning 
performance, we conduct a VBM analysis and search for brain regions whose GM 
volume are positively correlated with individual’s learning ability.   As guess2est 
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measures the distance to the performance of the ILM, a smaller number of guess2est 
stands for better learning performance. Therefore, we search for regions whose GM 
volume are negatively correlated with guess2est. 
We find that GM volume of regions in the cerebellum (peak: [-2, -58, -17], t = 5.21, z 
= 3.88; Figure 3a) and a cluster covering right postcentral gyrus, Inferior Parietal 
cortex and Supramarginal gyrus (with peak: [49, -28, 49], t = 4.97, z = 3.76; We label 
it as right postcentral parietal cortex; Figure 3b) show strong negative correlations 
with guess2est (Figure 3c, d), i.e. the higher of the GM volume in these regions are 
associated with lower guess2est (i.e. better learning performances). Our results here, 
by demonstrating a significant association between increased GM volume in the 
cerebellum and right postcentral parietal cortex with the learning performance, 
highlight a direct link between individual differences in the structural properties of 
these regions and the individual learning ability in a changing environment.  
Functional correlates of the individual differences in learning performance  
The results from our VBM analysis suggest that regions in the cerebellum and right 
postcentral parietal cortex are important for the learning performance in a changing 
environment. Based on this finding, we further investigate whether the functional 
involvement of these two regions during the presentation of new observations in our 
mean-guessing task also associates with individual differences in learning 
performance. To address this question, we apply a multiple linear regression analysis 
and search across the whole-brain for regions whose activities are negatively 
correlated with guess2est at the time when a new observation is presented. Significant 
results at p<0.001, FWE cluster corrected at p<0.05 are reported in Table S5. We find 
that the cerebellum and right postcentral parietal cortex indeed showed greater 
functional activation at the presentation of a new observation for subjects with better 
learning performance (significant at the threshold of p<0.001 at the voxel level, 
corrected for multiple comparison using small-volume FWE correction, p<0.05, for 
12 mm spheres surrounding the coordinates found in our VBM analysis above). These 
results suggest the congruency between the structural and functional features of the 
brain regions, and together they suggest that better learning ability in a changing 
environment is related to both the structural properties and the functional involvement 
of the cerebellum and right postcentral parietal cortex.  
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Figure 3. Structural and functional neural correlates of individual learning ability. 
Individual learning performance is associated with GM volume of regions in the 
cerebellum (illustrated in a) and a region covering right postcentral gyrus, Inferior 
Parietal cortex and Supramarginal gyrus (we label it as postcentral parietal cortex; 
illustrated in b). c, d. GM volume extracted from the peak in cerebellum and 
postcentral parietal cortex are negatively correlated with guess2est, the reverse index 
of learning ability. e, f. The functional activities in the cerebellum and postcentral 
parietal cortex during the presentation of a new observation are also negatively 
correlated with guess2est. All Pearson correlation reported here remains significant 
(p< 0.01) after excluding the subject who seems to have significantly worse 
performance than others.  
a.# b.#
c.# d.#
e.# f.#
[*2,#*58,#*17]# [49,#*28,#49]#
r#=#*0.77#
P#<0.001#
r#=#*0.59#
P#<0.01#
r#=#*0.73#
P#<0.01#
r#=#*0.79#
P#<0.001#
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Discussion 
 
In this study we investigate the structural and functional neural correlates of inter-
individual differences in learning performances in a changing environment. We find 
that there is great heterogeneity in individual learning performance in a changing 
environment and such individual differences are associated with the GM volume of 
regions in the cerebellum and right postcentral parietal cortex and with the functional 
involvement of these two regions during learning. These findings provide congruent 
structural and functional evidence for the importance of the cerebellum and right 
postcentral parietal cortex in the successful learning and information integration.  
Our finding that the GM volume and functional involvement of the cerebellum and 
postcentral parietal cortex are associated with individual learning performance 
suggest a link between the lower-order sensory-motor information processing and the 
belief updating in higher-order learning under uncertainty. Existing research has 
established that the sensory and motor system can efficiently integrate online new 
information in a statistically optimal manner (Ernst & Banks 2002). The cerebellum 
has been shown to be involved in adapting movements to novel situations through 
trial-by-trial learning mechanisms (Bastian 2006). In addition, the co-activation of 
postcentral gyrus, Inferior Parietal lobe and the cerebellum have been reported in the 
perceptual sensorimotor learning (Hadjikhani & Roland 1998; Inoue et al. 2000), 
enactment effect (Russ et al. 2003), arithmetic fact retrival (Grabner et al. 2009),  
visuospatial working memory and response-based sequence learning (Bischoff-Grethe 
et al. 2004). During evolution of human being, higher cognitive functions are evolved 
from the basic sensory-motor functions. Therefore, it is possible that the information 
updating mechanism of the sensory-motor system also serves the belief updating 
process in higher-level decision-making.  Consistently, it has been reported that a 
relationship exists between the cerebellum brain volume and cognitive function 
(Hogan et al. 2011), between abnormal exploration in autism and the cerebellum 
abnormality and between the cerebellum brain volume with children with attention 
deficit hyperactivity (ADHD) (Pierce & Courchesne 2001). 
Furthermore, our findings may shed new light on developing treatments for clinical 
psychological patients. Negative emotions (e.g. frustration, anxiety and helplessness) 
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and even psychological disorder symptoms (e.g. depression and anxiety disorders) 
can be induced if individuals are lack of the ability to correctly learn the state of the 
world. On one hand, individuals could deviate from optimal updating by 
overweighting the history, which leads to insensitivity to the fundamental changes of 
environments and failure of adapting to new situations. On the other hand, individuals 
may overweight new information, which causes over alertness and response to 
stochastic fluctuations. The cerebellum has been proposed to be a highly plastic and 
good target for clinical intervention (Mackie et al. 2007), providing new approaches 
for improving individual’s learning ability and consequently alleviating negative 
emotions induced by the failure of adapting to the changes of environments.   
Finally, we would like to point out that the relatively small sample size employed in 
our study allowed for the detection of moderate-sized effects, while brain structures 
whose GM volume correlate with learning performance of a less magnitude were not 
able to detect. Future research is required to test the generalizability of our findings, 
with larger and more diverse samples of participants.  
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Supplementary materials 
 
 
Figure S1. An example sequence and data of a session with stable mean. The solid 
blue line represented the underlying mean, which remained unknown to subjects and 
had to be guessed. Black dashed lines illustrated the standard deviation (SD), which 
changed independently of the mean. Green line represented the samples drawn from 
underlying distributions. Red dots were the guesses from a representative subject. The 
mean and noise level could suddenly change without informing subjects. 
 
 
VBM non-stationary cluster correction 
Non-stationary occurs due to non-isotropic (non-uniform) smoothness of VBM data. 
Because cluster size distribution varies depending on local smoothness, some clusters 
tend to be large in smooth areas, while in rough regions clusters tend to be small. This 
leads in particularly in VBM to invalid cluster size statistics and clusters sizes will be 
over- or underestimated. Therefore, we applied the non-stationary cluster correction 
when we reported the significant clusters based on the approach suggested by Ged 
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Ridyway: i.e., setting defaults.stats.rft.nonstat = 1 in spm_defaults.m, and fwhm_vox 
= 8 in spm_est_smoothness.m in SPM 8.  
 
 B0 
(Belief of underlying mean at time t = 
0) 
α0 
(Learning rate at time t = 0) 
1st set of priors  Beta distributed with shape 
parameters = 2 
100 × beta (2,2) 
Beta distributed with shape 
parameters = 0.5 
100 ×beta (0.5,0.5)  
2nd set of priors  Random integer numbers from 
uniform distribution within 0 to 100 
 
Beta distributed with shape 
parameters = 0.5 
100 × beta (0.5,0.5) 
3rd set of priors  Beta distributed with shape 
parameters = 2 
100 × beta (2,2) 
Beta distributed with shape 
parameters = 2 
100 × beta (2,2) 
4th set of priors  Random integer numbers from 
uniform distribution within 0 to 100 
 
Random numbers from uniform 
distribution within 0 to 1 
 
5th set of priors  Random integer numbers from 
uniform distribution within 0 to 100 
 
Random numbers from normal 
distribution, with mean = 0.5, SD = 1 
N (0.5,1) 
 
 
Table S4. Different sets of priors for ILM. In order to check whether the estimates of 
ILM are dependent on our settings of priors, we compare the estimated results from 
ILM with different sets of priors. Here each row represents one set of priors for B0 
(Belief of underlying mean at time t = 0; second column), and α0 (Learning rate at 
time t = 0; third column).  
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Figure S4. One example session of the estimated results from ILM with five 
different sets of priors. We can see that it seems that the estimates of ILM are not 
dependent on our settings of priors. Furthermore, to evaluate the consistency of the 
estimated results of all subjects, we calculate the average correlation coefficient 
between the estimates from ILM with each set of priors. The average Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.9996. 
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Region name 
MNI coordinates      
 (x y z) 
t value Cluster size 
Parietal_Inf_R 38 -44  40 7.58 3361 
Cerebellum_4_5_R 28 -44 -24 6.79 425 
Frontal_Mid_L -32  54   8 6.73 237 
Cerebellum_6_L -30 -54 -20 6.64 100 
Parietal_Inf_L -50 -30  46 6.2 40 
Thalamus 22 -30   0 4.87 44 
Parietal_Inf_L -40 -48  56 4.77 37 
Frontal_Mid_R 42  34  18 4.6 72 
 
Table S5. Regions whose activities are negatively correlated with guess2est at the 
time when a new observation is presented. Significant results were shown at the 
threshold of p<0.001 at the voxel level, and cluster level FWE corrected at p<0.05.  
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